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DAN T. COENEN†
ABSTRACT
To what extent does the First Amendment limit the ability of
prosecutors to offer evidence of a defendant’s past protected speech?
As it turns out, the Supreme Court has touched on this question in only
a handful of rulings, each of which was crafted to target only the
distinctive facts of the case at hand. Many lower courts, however, have
distilled from these decisions a sweeping, admissibility-favoring
constitutional rule. According to that rule, the First Amendment
imposes no limit on prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence—no
matter how prejudicial—so long as it meets the minimum standard of
evidentiary relevance. This approach is misguided. To begin with, it has
no support in the Court’s past decisions, which in fact favor, rather than
disfavor, a meaningful judicial role in evaluating the use of past-speech
evidence. Even more important, a hands-off stance clashes with longhonored free-speech-supporting constitutional policies. As a result, this
Article calls for judicial recognition of a new set of First Amendment
protections that operate whenever challenged past-speech evidence
involves expression on a matter of public concern. This build-out of
existing doctrine comports with the Court’s specialized protection of
public-concern speech in a wide variety of settings. It also gains
momentum from the Court’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional
review of generally applicable laws—in this case, the generally
applicable law of evidence. On close examination, the operative
doctrines in this field—as well as the policy considerations that underlie
those doctrines—provide strong support for an approach that imposes
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both procedural and substantive constraints on the use of publicconcern speech to secure criminal convictions. Such an approach is
offered here.
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INTRODUCTION
To what extent does the Free Speech Clause require judges to
exclude proof of a criminal defendant’s prior statements, otherwise
admissible under the rules of general evidence law? Assume, for
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example, that the State seeks to show that the defendant committed
murder by bombing a government building. Assume also that the
defendant denies any participation in the crime, but an alleged
coconspirator says the defendant lit the fuse. To help prove that he did
so, can the prosecutor offer testimony that the defendant once declared
himself to be a member of al-Qaeda? That, even if the defendant never
joined al-Qaeda, he had spoken about the justifiability of Jihad? That
several weeks earlier he declared in a speech that current national
policies warranted violent revolution? That hours before the bombing
he told a friend that the government had become intolerably
misguided? Each of these items of evidence would tend to show that
the defendant had a motive to engage in the bombing. As a result, they
would appear to be relevant and thus admissible under the general law
of evidence—or at least some judges might so rule.
The admission of any of these statements, however, would raise
significant tensions with the First Amendment. Under well-settled
Free Speech Clause law, after all, the government could not send the
defendant to jail simply because he made these utterances or because
of the views or associations these utterances reflect. Yet, revealing any
one of these statements to the jury might have the same practical effect
by decisively leading it to convict the defendant of the charged crime.
Evidence of this kind also invites a finding of guilt based on
justifications derived directly from the protected content of the
defendant’s past speech—reasons such as a perceived lack of
patriotism, political radicalism, or potential for “off the wall” behavior.
The question thus arises whether a prosecutor’s use of this type of
evidence—what is called here “past-speech evidence”—offends the
First Amendment.
The practical problems posed by the use of past-speech evidence
are far-reaching. Indeed, prosecutors offer proof of defendants’ past
statements on a daily basis in their efforts to secure convictions. And
these prior statements—commonly called “admissions”—routinely
come into evidence, even though they constitute instances of speech.1
More subtly, but no less importantly, the analytical issues raised by the
use of past-speech evidence ripple across major domains of First
Amendment law. Most notably, these cases simultaneously bring into
play Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the special protections
applicable to speech on matters of public concern; the extent to which
1. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (utilizing the more recent, and more accurate, terminology
of “[a]n [o]pposing [p]arty’s [s]tatement”).
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the Free Speech Clause can support as-applied challenges to generally
applicable laws; and the reach of constitutional limits that stem from
so-called “First Amendment due process.” It follows that the matters
considered here both implicate and help illuminate foundational
features of free-expression-law theory, doctrine, and practice.
Indeed, issues regarding the Government’s introduction of pastspeech evidence have surfaced in some of the highest-profile cases in
American history, including the 1921 trial of Sacco and Vanzetti, the
1951 espionage trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and the 1969 trial
of the Chicago Eight.2 Perhaps for this reason, analysts have suggested
that controversies over past-speech evidence most often arise in times
of “political tension.”3 Political tension, however, is a recurring
component of the American experience, fueled by such matters as antiwar protests, labor-related and other counterculture movements,
conflicts rooted in religious dissent, and the ever-churning challenges
stirred by our nation’s racial divisions. In recent years, for example,
courts have faced challenges to prosecutorial use, as evidence, of rap
lyrics authored by criminal defendants that are said to celebrate
violence or drug use.4
Given these conditions, one might expect that courts and
commentators would have worked through how evidence law and the
Free Speech Clause should and do fit together. As it turns out,
however, only one major scholarly article, written by Professor Peter
E. Quint, grapples with past-speech-evidence problems, and that piece
is now more than four decades old.5 In addition, prior judicial
treatments of these problems are marked by inconsistency and a lack
of analytical depth.6 One consequence of all of this is that lawyers may
2. See Peter E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of
Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1623 n.4, 1624, 1645
(1977).
3. Id. at 1678.
4. See, e.g., Andrea L. Dennis, Poetic (In)justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and
Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2007); Sean-Patrick Wilson, Rap Sheets: The
Constitutional and Societal Complications Arising from the Use of Rap Lyrics as Evidence at
Criminal Trials, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 345, 359–64 (2005).
5. Quint, supra note 2. Another helpful treatment is Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence of First
Amendment Activity at Trial: The Articulation of a Higher Evidentiary Standard, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1994), though it largely builds on Professor Quint’s earlier work. See also Helen A.
Anderson, The Freedom to Speak and the Freedom to Listen: The Admissibility of the Criminal
Defendant’s Taste in Entertainment, 83 OR. L. REV. 899, 902 (2004) (noting that “a criminal
defendant’s viewing, listening, or reading habits may be used as evidence against that defendant,
and that the constitutional implications of such evidence are rarely discussed”).
6. See Amy Pomerantz Nickerson, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment: Towards
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well miss chances to register objections to the introduction of
potentially excludable past-speech proof or to frame objections in
proper terms.7
These dynamics stem in part from another curiosity: the Supreme
Court has squarely confronted the sort of question considered here in
only one prior case, Haupt v. United States.8 In the seven decades since
Haupt, however, free-speech doctrine has undergone a process of allbut-revolutionary change. This process has engaged the Court in
building out a host of new speech-protective doctrines—especially for
speech on “matters of public concern”9—that push in favor of placing
constitutional limits on the use of past-speech evidence. On the other
hand, a restraintist approach might—at least at first blush—seem to
find support in modern precedents that reflect judicial hesitance to
vindicate as-applied challenges to so-called “generally applicable
laws.”10 There is, however, a large problem with urging that the
generally applicable character of evidence law precludes as-applied
challenges to the introduction of past-speech evidence. The problem is
that key decisions of the Court—such as Sherbert v. Verner,11 United
States v. O’Brien,12 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,13 and a host
of First Amendment due process rulings14—support the making of
context-specific constitutional challenges to generally applicable laws.
Moreover, the expression-protective features of these authorities find
their driving force in policy reasons that carry over in powerful ways to
past-speech-evidence cases. In sum, both the key authorities and their
underlying logic suggest that courts are constitutionally required to
thoughtfully assess the admissibility of past-speech evidence,

a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 845 (2010) (noting “doctrinal
inconsistencies and confusion”).
7. See United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting counsel’s failure in
lodging an objection “to specify exactly what role constitutional considerations should play”);
Anderson, supra note 5, at 901 (noting that missed opportunities sometimes arise because “the
law in this area is underdeveloped”); see also United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 751
(4th Cir. 2011) (requiring that evidentiary objections on constitutional grounds—there, pursuant
to the Confrontation Clause—be specifically so made).
8. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
9. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 458 (2011).
10. See infra notes 107–12 and accompanying text.
11. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
12. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
13. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
14. See infra Part III.D.
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regardless of its relevance, pursuant to a speech-sensitive balancing
analysis when prosecutors seek to use that evidence at trial.
This Article develops these ideas in four parts. Part I canvasses the
Court’s rulings on past-speech evidence, demonstrating that none of
those rulings, apart from the well-aged decision in Haupt, deals
squarely with the intersection of the rules of evidence and the Free
Speech Clause. Part I also explains that despite the contrary views of
many lower courts, no prior Supreme Court ruling—including Dawson
v. Delaware15—supports the admission of all relevant past-speech
evidence regardless of First Amendment considerations.16 Part II goes
on to show that the Court’s post-Haupt rulings on expression related
to matters of public concern in fact support placing meaningful
constitutional limits on the use of past-speech evidence. Part III then
turns to the Court’s jurisprudence of generally applicable rules and
demonstrates why that body of law likewise cuts in favor of, rather than
against, the recognition of such limits.
Finally, Part IV considers what those limits should be. Drawing on
precedents crafted in analogous contexts, it posits (1) that trial judges,
after hearing arguments away from the jury, should have to issue
reasoned rulings whenever defendants object to prosecutorial use of
public-concern-related past-speech proof, and (2) that appellate courts
should subject adverse rulings on such objections to a form of review
much more exacting than the abuse-of-discretion standard ordinarily
applied in this set of cases. Part IV goes on to reject a variety of possible
substantive legal tests for assessing whether past-speech evidence is
rightly subject to exclusion. The best approach, according to the
synthesis presented in Part IV, is one that requires courts to weigh
whether the government’s interest in using any item of such evidence
outweighs all the costs that introducing it would place on First
Amendment concerns—with an emphasis on the point that those
concerns reach much further than others have recognized in the past.
Embracing this set of rules would, as it ought to, constitutionalize
evidence law with regard to prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence.
It is understandable that many trial lawyers, trial courts, and evidence
law scholars tend to view these cases through the lens of Federal Rule
of Evidence 403. This rule, after all, permits judges to exclude evidence
that present risks of “unfair prejudice.”17 The doctrine for policing
15. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
16. See infra notes 34–35, 41–47, 53–66 and accompanying text.
17. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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past-speech evidence proposed in this Article, however, reaches well
beyond the minimal limits imposed by Rule 403 and the jurisprudence
that has crystallized around it. And that is as it should be. Precisely
because past-speech evidence raises specialized First Amendment
concerns, a specialized set of First Amendment restrictions should
control its use.
There is no pretense here that applying these restrictions will
always be easy. Even more emphatically, there is no suggestion that
defendants should routinely, or even commonly, succeed when they
raise Free Speech Clause objections to the use of past-speech proof. If
core First Amendment values are to receive their fair due, however,
courts should afford such objections more than an unthinking, waveof-the-hand dismissal when public-concern speech is in the picture.
This Article shows how courts can and should deal more thoughtfully
with the serious constitutional problems posed by prosecutorial use of
past-speech evidence.
I. THE LAW OF FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON PAST-SPEECH
EVIDENCE
Many trials involve the use of past speech as evidence. Most cases,
however, do not concern the sort of constitutional issues that are the
subject of this Article. For example, confessions made to police officers
come in the form of words. But no one would suggest that the Free
Speech Clause bars the admission of those confessions at trial. Other
forms of speech-based evidence also fall beyond the scope of this
Article because they do not, even remotely, involve expression on
matters of public concern. Illustrative are intercepted crime-planning
communications (“Let’s meet in an hour to get ready for the bank
robbery.”) and pre-crime inculpatory statements (“Tomorrow, I’m
going to kill Mortimer!”).
Also outside the scope of this Article are three types of cases that
do involve public-concern-speech evidence. First, some cases involve
prosecutorial use of past public-concern-related utterances made not
by the criminal defendant, but by a third-party witness. In these cases,
any burden placed on the speaker typically is limited. Defense
witnesses, for example, might experience discomfort when prosecutors
impeach them based on prior inconsistent statements they made on
public issues. But any such burden on speech is far removed from a
criminal conviction of a defendant supported by that defendant’s own
past pronouncements.
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Second, in some cases, litigants offer evidence of past speech by a
government official in seeking civil relief not against that official, but
(at least in practical effect) against the government itself.18 Courts, for
example, have considered evidence of President Trump’s pre-election
statements about Muslims in lawsuits challenging the so-called “travel
ban.”19 But an effort to secure injunctive relief from a government
entity—which did not itself previously utter any words—is very
different from a prosecutor’s use of an individual’s past speech as
evidence of that very individual’s commission of a crime. Cases of that
sort, accordingly, are not considered here.
Finally, past-speech evidence sometimes is offered against
individual defendants in civil proceedings, including when plaintiffs
seek monetary relief. It may be that the arguments made here with
regard to criminal prosecutions should carry over to such cases,20
especially because the Court often equates civil remedies and criminal
sanctions when applying First Amendment limits.21 Perhaps, however,
close analysis will reveal reasons to treat civil and criminal cases
differently in this context.22 This Article thus leaves it to others to
explore how the First Amendment bears on the use of evidence in civil
trials, administrative hearings, and other noncriminal decision-making
processes.

18. Among these cases are those in which injunctive relief is nominally, but not functionally,
sought against a named government official under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
19. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir.)
(considering “numerous campaign statements expressing animus towards the Islamic faith”),
vacated and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). In Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), the
Supreme Court upheld the travel ban but emphasized the special circumstances of the case in
doing so. See id. at 2418–20. Of particular importance to the Court’s endorsement of a very
“narrow standard of review” was the origin of the travel restriction in both foreign-affairs-related
immigration policy and “national security” concerns. Id. at 2419 (citation omitted). Even in this
context, however, the Court did not disclaim all authority to consider the “plaintiff’s extrinsic
evidence.” Id. at 2420. For a detailed discussion of the how courts should approach campaignspeech evidence as a general matter when government motives are at issue, see Michael B.
Coenen, Campaign Communications and the Problem of Government Motive, 18 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. (forthcoming 2018).
20. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 15–16.
21. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964); see also Michael B. Coenen, Of
Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 991, 993–94 (2012).
22. See Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533,
1563–77 (2017) (developing this idea by highlighting that different forms of sanctions, civil or
criminal in character, can have a key impact in the application of Free Speech Clause protections).
See generally Coenen, supra note 21 (developing this differential-sanction concept in detail).
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In sum, this Article considers only prosecutorial use of publicconcern-related speech made by defendant-declarants. The Supreme
Court has touched on this subject in several rulings.23 In only three
cases, however, has it dealt specifically with objections to evidentiary
use of such speech. And in only one case—Haupt—did the Court
confront a constitutional challenge to the use of past-speech evidence
that was deemed relevant to a disputed factual issue.
A. Haupt v. United States
The prosecution of Hans Max Haupt, a German-born naturalized
American citizen, arose out of the surreptitious entry of a group of Nazi
saboteurs, including Haupt’s son, into the United States during World
War II.24 The indictment charged Haupt with conspiring to commit
treason after his son arrived in the country.25 The overt acts said to
support this allegation included Haupt’s purchase of a car for his son’s
use, his helping his son get a job in a munitions plant, and his allowing
his son to live in the family home.26 At trial, Haupt argued that these
actions were not motivated by a desire to aid the enemy, as the charged
crime required, but instead by the natural parental impulse to help
one’s child.27 In response, the Government offered proof, admitted by
the trial judge, of statements “showing sympathy with Germany and
with Hitler.”28 In particular, the prosecution proved that Haupt had
stated “that after the war he intended to return to Germany, that the
United States was going to be defeated, that he would never permit his
boy to join the American Army, [and] that he would kill his son before
he would send him to fight Germany.”29
On appeal, Haupt argued that the trial court erred in permitting
the Government to use these statements as evidence against him,30 but

23. See infra notes 70, 114–21 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476 (1993)) and note 314 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); see
also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948–49 (1983) (deeming the defendant’s proven “desire to
start a race war” relevant to establishing the aggravating factor of creating a “great risk of death
to many persons,” but focusing on the defendant’s assertion, unrelated to evidence law, that
“racial motive” had improperly operated as a “non-statutory aggravating circumstance”).
24. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 633 (1947).
25. Id. at 633–34.
26. Id. at 634.
27. Id. at 641.
28. Id. at 642.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Justice Jackson rejected this argument in an opinion for the Court.31
Providing only a single-paragraph treatment of the issue, Jackson
reasoned that “these statements were explicit and clearly were
admissible on the question of intent and adherence to the enemy”
because they showed “hostility to the United States.”32 At the same
time, he observed that “[s]uch testimony is to be scrutinized with care
to be certain the statements are not expressions of mere lawful and
permissible difference of opinion with our own government or quite
proper appreciation of the land of birth.”33 Haupt thus leaves behind
tricky questions. It is no small problem, after all, to separate statements
that reflect “hostility to the United States” from statements that reflect
a mere “difference of opinion with our own government.”34 In addition,
the Court’s terse analysis cannot fairly be viewed as doing more than
resolving the discrete evidentiary dispute raised by the facts of the case.
Haupt does not hold, or even suggest, that the First Amendment never
blocks prosecutorial use of otherwise relevant evidence, particularly
under modern-day principles of free-expression law. Indeed, Haupt
signals—albeit while offering no particularized guidance on this
point—that the introduction of past-speech evidence “is to be
scrutinized with care.”35
B. Post-Haupt Cases
Several post-Haupt cases touch on the subject of prosecutorial use
of past-speech evidence—most notably, United States v. Abel36 and
Dawson v. Delaware.37 But these rulings, like Haupt, fall far short of
negating all Free Speech Clause limits on the Government’s use of
relevant past-speech evidence in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, close
examination shows that they do not signal in any way the propriety of

31. Id.
32. Id. As it turns out, in considering this issue, the majority in Haupt made no express
reference to the First Amendment. For this reason, some observers might try to claim that the
case does not involve an application of constitutional principles, as opposed to principles of
general evidence law. At the very least, however, the Court in its later work has relied on Haupt
in laying down governing constitutional principles. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476,
489–90 (1993). As a result, the analysis set forth here proceeds on the assumption that, under
authority laid down by the Supreme Court, the admission of the prior-speech evidence in Haupt
comported with First Amendment requirements.
33. Haupt, 330 U.S. at 642.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 46–48 (1984).
37. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 160–64 (1992).
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limiting free-expression rights in this set of cases. Particularly
unenlightening on this score is the Court’s 1984 ruling in Abel. There,
in a prosecution for bank robbery, the defendant offered the testimony
of a witness, Robert Mills, indicating that a third person had tried to
frame the defendant as a means of escaping punishment for the crime.38
In response, the Government submitted proof of the membership of
both the defendant and the defense witness Mills in the Aryan
Brotherhood, as well as testimony that Brotherhood members were
sworn to lie on each other’s behalf.39 The Court upheld the trial judge’s
admission of this evidence, deeming it probative of the witness’s bias
and resulting lack of credibility.40
For two separate reasons, Abel is uninformative with regard to the
matter considered in this Article—that is, the scope of First
Amendment limits on evidentiary use of a criminal defendant’s prior
statements. First, that case did not involve a constitutional question at
all. Rather, the defendant himself proceeded from the assumption
“that the question is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence”41—
in particular, Rule 403, which provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.”42
In turn, the Court found no reversible error because the trial court had
not “abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,”43
particularly because the “district court is accorded a wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.”44
Second, the Court specifically distinguished the ordinary case involving
past-speech evidence. It emphasized that the “highly probative”45
proof presented in Abel “was not offered to convict [the defendant
Abel] of a crime, but to impeach Mills’ testimony.”46 As a result, Abel
offers no guidance in assessing objections—especially First
Amendment objections—to past statements made by defendants

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Abel, 469 U.S. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Abel, 469 U.S. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 53.
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themselves and offered by the prosecution as substantive evidence of
guilt.47
The Court’s latest encounter with a free-speech-based evidentiary
objection came in Dawson v. Delaware. That case concerned a
sentencing hearing that followed a jury’s finding that the defendant, a
white man, had committed the murder of a white victim during a
burglary in the wake of a prison escape.48 At the sentencing hearing,
the trial judge admitted evidence that the defendant was a member of
an Aryan Brotherhood gang at the Delaware State Penitentiary as well
as a stipulation that read in its entirety: “The Aryan Brotherhood
refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960’s in California
in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling
themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons
including Delaware.”49 On these facts, the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the jury’s imposition of the death sentence.50 It acknowledged
that this evidence did not bear on the three death-sentence-supporting
aggravating circumstances on which the prosecution had relied—
namely, that the murder was committed (1) by an escaped prisoner, (2)
during a burglary, and (3) for monetary gain.51 Even so, the state court
concluded that the evidence tended to establish the defendant’s bad
character, thus appropriately counterbalancing the defendant’s
mitigating evidence of good character as shown by his past acts of
kindness to family members and voluntary participation in drug and
alcohol rehabilitation programs.52
Writing for eight members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
overturned the state court ruling on the ground that the challenged
evidence had “no bearing” on the issues in the case.53 He emphasized
at the outset “that the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to
the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at
sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected
by the First Amendment.”54 In this case, however, the challenged
evidence lacked significance because the two-sentence stipulation
47. Accord Faulkner, supra note 5, at 36 n.221 (noting that Abel does not address a First
Amendment challenge).
48. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 160–61 (1992).
49. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 163.
51. Id. at 162–63.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 168.
54. Id. at 165.
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about the Aryan Brotherhood provided only minimal information,55
and because the racist nature of the Brotherhood had no meaningful
connection to the white-on-white murder.56 The Chief Justice noted
that “we would have a much different case” if the State had proved
“that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist prison gang that is
associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that
advocates the murder of fellow inmates.”57 On the actual facts,
however:
Whatever label is given to the evidence presented, . . . we conclude
that Dawson’s First Amendment rights were violated by the
admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence . . . , because the
evidence proved nothing more than Dawson’s abstract
beliefs. . . . [O]n the present record one is left with the feeling that the
Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the jury
would find these beliefs morally reprehensible.58

Justice Thomas filed a vigorous dissent, reasoning that even
“abstract beliefs” can be relevant to the issue of “‘bad’ character,”
which the Court’s past rulings had deemed broadly provable for
sentencing purposes.59 In addition, he urged that Dawson’s gang
membership was relevant for reasons that went beyond establishing his
“‘abstract’ racist ‘beliefs.’”60 In particular, Justice Thomas argued, this
evidence tended to demonstrate that Dawson “had engaged in some
sort of forbidden activities while in prison”; to prove his “future
dangerousness”; and “to rebut [his] attempt to show that he was kind
to others.”61 Justice Thomas reasoned that jurors could draw on “their
knowledge of the world” in assessing this evidence, especially because
“[t]he concept of a prison gang is not so mysterious that it requires an
encyclopedic definition.”62
Responding to these observations, Chief Justice Rehnquist
questioned whether, in fact, “jurors would be familiar with” the nature
of prison gangs and concluded that the unembellished “Aryan
Brotherhood evidence . . . cannot be viewed as relevant ‘bad’ character

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. (noting “the narrowness of the stipulation”).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 167 (citation omitted).
Id. at 176, 178 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 168 (majority opinion)).
Id. at 171 (quoting id. at 167) (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
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evidence in its own right.”63 For Justice Thomas, however, this line of
analysis served only to “bend traditional concepts of relevance.”64 And
this bending, for him, was especially problematic because he viewed
the majority opinion itself as endorsing the admissibility of past-speech
evidence so long as it is relevant.65 In fact, however, the Chief Justice
never embraced that position. Rather, he simply observed that a
stronger showing of relevance would “have made this a different case”
and “might have avoided” the constitutional problem the Court had
detected.66
The bottom line is that the Court’s three key rulings on speechbased evidence have not removed—and instead have highlighted—the
doctrinal indeterminacy that pervades this subject. The Court has set
forth no legal test for assessing the admissibility of past-speech
evidence. Nor has it even begun to suggest how this set of cases fits
within the overarching structure of its now-elaborate free-speech
jurisprudence. Indeed, as discussed above, only Haupt concerned an
objection to the admissibility of evidence that the Court viewed (to use
the words of Dawson) as having some “bearing on the issue being
tried.”67 Without question, Haupt signals—as Dawson later
confirmed—“that the Constitution “does not erect a per se barrier”
against the use of past-speech evidence.68 But this proposition is neither
controversial nor enlightening as to the key question considered in this

63. Id. at 168 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 174 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 179–80.
66. Id. at 167–68 (majority opinion). See also, e.g., J. Christopher Naftzger, Note, The
Admissibility of First Amendment Protected Conduct as an Aggravating Factor in Capital
Sentencing Trials After Dawson v. Delaware, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 363 (1993)
(“Dawson . . . did little to establish a concrete rule concerning what constitutionally protected
conduct is admissible as aggravating evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial.”). In
addition, even Dawson’s pronouncement about the absence of a “per se barrier” was targeted
only “at sentencing.” Dawson, 503 U.S. at 165. Thus, even if that statement somehow was meant
to give rise to an admission-friendly, just-show-relevance principle, that principle would not
necessarily apply to trial (as opposed to sentencing) proceedings, in light of the especially
generous rules of admissibility that have long been applied in the sentencing context. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820–21 (1991). Standing this idea on its head, one court has
raised the possibility that any limit that Dawson imposes on the use of evidence in sentencing
proceedings might properly be deemed inapplicable to trial proceedings, thus negating the
operation of the First Amendment altogether in the trial context. Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180,
185 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996). This suggestion, however, has things exactly backwards, in light of the
law’s distinctive evidentiary permissiveness in sentencing proceedings. See FED. R. EVID.
1101(d)(3) (specifying that evidence rules do not apply in sentencing proceedings).
67. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168.
68. Id. at 165.
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Article: To what extent does the First Amendment block prosecutorial
use of a defendant’s past speech at trial, even if it is relevant and
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence?
C. The Lower Courts
Not surprisingly, given the pervasiveness of both communicative
activity and its routine use by prosecutors as inculpatory proof, lower
courts have encountered a wide array of cases in which defendants
raised First Amendment objections to the use of past-speech evidence.
In response, some courts—especially before Dawson—signaled the
need for serious-minded consideration of constitutional objections,
regardless of evidentiary relevance.69 But most courts, especially in
recent years, have taken a different view, concluding—often based on
Dawson—that the First Amendment never forecloses the use of pastspeech evidence so long as it is relevant.70 Given the centrality of the
69. See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543, n.7 (5th
Cir. 1978) (excluding evidence because “[i]ts evidentiary value . . . is far outweighed by the
defendants’ first amendment interests”); U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.
Supp. 1155, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (deeming “low probative value” to be “substantially
outweighed by the defendants’ strong interest in preserving their First Amendment rights”);
United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (“[I]t is within the
province of the trial judge to exclude . . . evidence if he finds that it is not probative or is unduly
prejudicial.”); Ayers v. State, 645 A.2d 22, 39 (Md. 1994) (seeming to deem past-speech evidence
inadmissible unless “[a]t a minimum” it is “contemporaneous with the crime” or “part of the chain
of events that led to the crime”); see also United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(recognizing the possibility that there is a need to “plac[e] a thumb” on the Rule 403 scale to
safeguard “First Amendment concerns”); United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 961 (9th Cir.
2007) (Kleinfeld, C.J., concurring) (“Barring exceptional circumstances, . . . what people
read . . . should not be used to prove what they intend to do.”); Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank &
Tr. Co., 641 F.2d 457, 467 (7th Cir. 1981) (excluding evidence under Rule 403 based on “the First
Amendment right to petition which Noerr-Pennington protects”); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of
Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002) (applying strict scrutiny in assessing a First
Amendment objection to a subpoena of a bookstore purchase record without questioning its
evidentiary relevance); Nickerson, supra note 6, at 864 (noting that “courts have employed a
variety of multipart tests” that take account of the “defendant’s . . . First Amendment interests”
in an effort to secure evidence about the identity of people who have made anonymous Internet
postings).
70. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 927 (noting that “many . . . cases . . . reduce the
constitutional issue to one of relevance”); see e.g., United States v. Rembert, 851 F.3d 836, 838–
39 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that a relevant Facebook video was
admissible), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 401; United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 840–41 (2d Cir.
2015) (highlighting that the defendant’s First Amendment rights were not implicated when the
district court found a rap video and tattoos admissible as evidence for the prosecution); United
States v. Walters, 350 F. App’x 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The First Amendment does not bar
evidence of a person’s associations when it provides a link to criminal activity.”); Dressler v.
McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with the defendant’s First
Amendment claim, and highlighting that “the jury was permitted to draw an inference about [the
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relevance concept to evidence law, these decisions may also suggest a
sensitivity to the generally applicable character of that law.71 On this
view, because the basic relevance test of admissibility applies across the
board to evidence of all kinds, there is no good reason to meddle with
that rule on constitutional grounds simply because a small number of
its applications involve the potentially prejudicial use of past-speech
proof.72

defendant’s] state of mind based on the fact that he maintained a collection of photographs”);
Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that “Dawson simply requires that
the evidence be relevant” (citation omitted)); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1527 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“A person’s beliefs, superstitions, or affiliation with a religious group is properly
admissible where probative of an issue in a criminal prosecution.” (citations omitted)); United
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment does not compel
the exclusion of evidence simply because it consists of speech. If a defendant’s words or his silence
are relevant to prove some issue in the case, they are admissible subject to the rules of
evidence . . . .”); State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 446 (Conn. 2003) (holding that even if the
defendant’s statement constituted protected speech, “[it] was still admissible because it was
relevant”); State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073, 1090 (Or. 1996) (“[U]nder Dawson, the trial court’s
admission of the evidence at issue here did not violate defendant’s First Amendment rights.”).
Some lower courts also have found support for this position in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476
(1993), based on the Court’s observation that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the
evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.” Id. at
489. This passage, however, in no way establishes that the First Amendment always requires
admission of past-speech evidence so long as it is relevant. A mother might well say, for example,
“I do not prohibit my ten-year-old from riding her bicycle on roadways.” To make such a
pronouncement, however, does not mean that the mother does not ever prohibit her ten-year-old
from riding on roadways—for example, she might restrain her child from weaving through traffic
on Fifth Avenue or from pedaling down a dark desert highway (and, all the more so, “a dark
desert highway” to the Hotel California!). See THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL
CALIFORNIA (Asylum Records 1976). A reading of Mitchell that comports with this interpretive
principle makes especially good sense in light of the context of that case. As noted below, the
defendant’s argument in Mitchell stemmed from the idea that prosecutions under the challenged
hate-crime law would broadly lead to the improper use of past-speech evidence. See infra notes
114–18 and accompanying text. One (entirely proper) response of the Court was to challenge the
premise of this argument by noting that under Haupt and Dawson, many uses of past-speech
evidence are totally proper. But saying that many uses of such evidence are totally proper is a far
cry from saying that all uses of such evidence are totally proper. See also Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489
(reiterating the Haupt Court’s insistence that such evidence “be scrutinized with care”). The
broader point is that Mitchell simply did not present the question whether all First Amendment
objections to relevant past-speech evidence should be barred. See infra notes 115–18 and
accompanying text. And even if the Court somehow meant to declare—however oddly and
obliquely—that all free-speech-based challenges to proffers of relevant past-speech evidence
were henceforth verboten, the significance of such a proclamation deserved, and still deserves,
more thoughtful treatment than a one-sentence dictum.
71. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses
of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1283 n.2, 1315, 1340–41 (2005) (noting the distinctive character of cases that only involve freespeech-evidence issues in discussing generally applicable laws).
72. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
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Is this unwaveringly accommodating approach to the use of
relevant past-speech evidence justifiable? We have already seen that it
is not justifiable as a matter of stare decisis; in particular, the Court’s
rulings in Dawson and other past cases do not command this approach.
But reaching that conclusion merely highlights the more basic question
as to what governing rules should operate in this set of cases. Working
through this matter brings into focus three more-particularized
questions: First, precisely what is it about past-speech evidence that
creates difficulties with its use under Free Speech Clause principles?
Second, how do constitutional doctrines dealing with generally
applicable laws—and the policies that underlie those doctrines—
intersect with disputes about the admissibility of past-speech evidence?
And third, if the First Amendment requires judges to police the use of
otherwise relevant past-speech proof, what governing limits does that
Amendment impose? The remainder of this Article explores these
questions.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND PAST-SPEECH EVIDENCE
Courts routinely receive into evidence out-of-court statements
made by criminal defendants. These statements range from confessions
obtained by law enforcement authorities to electronically intercepted
conspiratorial communications to boasts made to friends about having
committed a crime. Few analysts would suggest that the First
Amendment requires exclusion of evidence of this kind. But given that
fact, how should courts identify the types of past-speech evidence that
might qualify for exclusion based on free-speech principles? Working
through this conundrum requires courts to direct attention to an
important body of post-Haupt law.
In a long and strong line of modern decisions, the Court has
declared that the Constitution affords “special protection” to speech
that addresses “matters of public concern.”73 This protection comports
with the First Amendment’s core objective of ensuring the “robust
debate of public issues,”74 and all the more so because “speech

in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 461–62 (1996) (noting, with regard to
breach-of-the-peace laws, that their application “not only to speech, but also to conduct posing a
risk of disorder” carries with it a “breadth [that] usually decreases . . . the chance of illicit[,
viewpoint-repressive governmental] purpose”).
73. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 458 (2011).
74. Id. at 452 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760
(1985)).
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concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government.”75 Stated otherwise, protecting speech on matters
of public concern directly advances the First Amendment’s most
salient (or least controversial) overarching aims—namely, to foster a
well-functioning participatory democracy and to facilitate the search
for truth on matters of the highest importance to society as a whole.76
There is a less apparent point, too. Protecting highly provocative
speech on political and social matters—that is, the sort of speech that
is the primary subject of investigation in this Article—links up in a
special way with ensuring that citizens are afforded the chance to
pursue individual self-realization through communicative activity.77
This is the case because not many citizens are willing to bear the social,
and perhaps legal, costs of “putting themselves out there” as speechwielding, counterculture iconoclasts.78 And if they are, the very
radicalism that leads them to incur such costs seems likely to be tied
tightly to a core sense of self.79
Against this backdrop, the Court has chosen to give “broad
protection” to speech on matters of public concern.80 It has done so in
part by defining that term expansively to include all expression that can
“be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.”81 It does not matter that the
“contribution to public discourse” of a particular item of such speech
“may be negligible.”82 It is also of no consequence that such an

75. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
76. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 935–40 (19th ed.
2016).
77. See id. at 938–39.
78. Ho Hwan Park, Youjia Zhou & Myungweon Choi, When Are Individuals Innovative?,
17 J. PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1 (2018) (“Conscientious individuals tend to follow rules, conform to
norms, be cautious and risk averse, and strictly adhere to standards; thus, they are less likely to
come up with new ideas and change the status quo.”).
79. Suggestive of the pressures described here, and of the self-actualizing responses one
might make to them, is an iconic, though cryptic, counterculture anthem of the early 1970s. See
DAVID CROSBY, Almost Cut My Hair, on DÉJÀ VU (Atlantic Records 1970). In it, the singer—
himself a counterculture icon—describes the choice made when “I almost cut my hair.” Id.
Ruminations that crop up in the song concern “paranoia” connected with the possibility of
“lookin’ in my mirror and seeing a police car.” Id. But the hair, in the end, remains unscissored.
Id. Despite the risks of having unconventionally long hair, the singer in the end concludes, “I’m
not givin’ in an inch to fear” because “I feel like letting my freak flag fly.” Id.
80. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
82. Id. at 460.

COENEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

12/13/2018 11:02 AM

FREE SPEECH AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

657

utterance is “inappropriate or controversial”83 or “arouses
contempt.”84 To the contrary, “in public debate [we] must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech.”85 These principles are so
vibrant that the Court has drawn on them to deem such
pronouncements as “God hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,”
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “Pope in Hell” as embodiments
of speech on matters of public concern.86
In addition to defining the notion of public-concern speech
broadly, the Court has seized on this concept to safeguard expression
in many different legal settings. These rulings stretch across
defamation law87 to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress88 to statutes that limit media reports of purportedly
confidential information89 to public-employee-expression cases.90
Along the way, the Court has declared without reservation that speech
on matters of public concern “occupies the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.”91
Courts accordingly must take account of public-concern-speech
doctrine as they grapple with First Amendment limits on the use of
expression-related evidence. Indeed, public-concern-speech doctrine
bears on the formulation of those limits in two distinct ways. First, this
body of law provides a previously endorsed, and thus ready-to-use,
touchstone for separating speech-related evidence that is worthy of
First Amendment scrutiny from speech-related evidence that is not—
such as speech in the form of confessions and crime-planning
conversations. Second, the public-concern-speech doctrine now
operates with much force in many cases, including many civil cases.
83. Id. at 453 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)).
84. Id. at 458.
85. Id. (quoting Boss v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
86. Id. at 454 (citation omitted).
87. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
88. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 443.
89. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534–35 (2001); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (identifying a special need to protect public-school
speech if it “can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue”).
90. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987). A particularly significant publicemployee-speech case is Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), which is discussed at some length
infra notes 232–42.
91. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 145); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t
of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008). All these decisions comport with a broader point, too—in
many contexts, going back many years, the Court has emphasized that speech on political and
social issues rests at “the core of the First Amendment.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 926–27 (1982) (describing “highly charged political rhetoric” this way).
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And if public-concern speech merits this sort of “broad protection” in
civil law, it becomes hard to see why it should receive no serious
scrutiny when it is offered as evidence to secure criminal convictions
that might lead to years of imprisonment or even death.92
One possible response to this line of analysis posits that whether
or not public-concern speech is in the picture, the government cannot
be regarded as “abridging the freedom of speech”—as proscribed by
the text of the First Amendment—unless it moves to sanction speech
itself, such as by making speech with specific characteristics the actus
reus of a crime. It is well settled, however, that the First Amendment
sweeps more broadly than that.93 Indeed, Dawson removes any doubt
on this score. As the Court there explained, “the reach of the First
Amendment” often blocks the state from “criminalizing . . . conduct”
that takes the form of speech.94 But the Amendment “goes further than
that,”95 including, in proper cases, by preventing the State from
employing speech as evidence.96
Dawson thus confirms what many other cases suggest—namely,
that prosecutorial deployments of past-speech evidence “burden,”97
“impair,”98 or “affect adversely”99 protected expression in a manner
that brings the First Amendment into play. To be sure, courts might
nonetheless embrace a constitutional rule that allows all uses of past
speech “just” or “simply” as evidence so long as that evidence
surpasses the minimum threshold of relevance.100 Such a sweeping
exemption from any constitutional protection, however, is hard to
square with the idea that such uses of speech impose cognizable First
Amendment burdens on defendant-declarants. And this conclusion
becomes even more compelling when it is recognized that prosecutorial
use of past-speech evidence encroaches on free-expression rights in no
fewer than three separate ways: (1) by exposing defendants to
92. But cf. United States v. Herron, No. 10–CR–0615, 2014 WL 1871909, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2014) (dismissing the Court’s protection of public-concern speech in Snyder as
inapplicable in the past-speech-evidence context).
93. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that
forced disclosure of a membership list abridged members’ speech rights, even though those
disclosures did not subject the members to governmentally imposed criminal or civil sanctions).
94. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992).
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 929 (emphasizing this point).
97. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).
98. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
99. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
100. Volokh, supra note 71, at 1315, 1340.
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conviction based on the factfinder’s unfairly prejudicial consideration
of such speech; (2) by subjecting defendants to convictions based on
such speech even in the absence of unfair prejudice; and (3) by chilling
provocative expression by defendants and by others as well.
A. Convictions Based on Unfair Prejudice
The Government’s use of past-speech evidence burdens that
speech, first and foremost, because that evidence might well come to
weigh on the minds of jurors for legally impermissible reasons. Trials
are complex affairs. Jurors find themselves in an unfamiliar setting.
Judges provide them with instructions before, during, and after the
submission of evidence. Jurors must sift through large amounts of
information. But when they learn that the defendant is a Nazi or a
Klansman, that information is likely to stick in their minds. Such
evidence—at least for most—is jarring, hurtful, and deeply
disturbing.101 Thus, “[i]n a case such as this, a jury is unlikely to be
neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech, posing a real danger
of becoming an instrument for the suppression of . . . vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasan[t] expression.”102
Whenever a trial judge admits past-speech evidence, it is—like all
evidence—admissible only for specific purposes. As the Introduction
to this Article shows, for example, such evidence might help to show
that the defendant committed a criminal act by suggesting the existence
of an underlying motive for engaging in that behavior. Jurors, however,
might view motive-related evidence as showing something more—a
lack of honor, reason, or restraint; future unpredictability; or
outlandish foolishness.103 Those charged with factfinding might
conclude, in other words, that the defendant is bad, radical, or weird
and deserving of punishment for that reason.104 The mysteries of
101. See, e.g., United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that proof
of one defendant’s connection to the Hell’s Angels motorcycle organization brought such a risk
of prejudice in a methamphetamine-manufacturing prosecution that the conviction must be
reversed in case the jury had deemed the defendant “guilty by association,” notwithstanding a
limiting instruction).
102. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
103. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404. See also Quint, supra note 2, at 1658 n.81 (noting the
“particular dangers” of juries’ assessments of this kind because of their built-in “majoritarian”
cast and lack of sensitivity to systemic free-speech values).
104. See, e.g., Stuart P. Fischoff, Gangsta’ Rap and a Murder in Bakersfield, 29 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 795, 797 (1999) (noting expert testimony that juries use rap lyrics to reach guilty
verdicts improperly because of “negative personality trait associations conjured up by such
inflammatory lyrics”).
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psychological analysis make it difficult to say that all jurors in all
circumstances ignore such appraisals of character in the decisionmaking process, even when they are instructed to do just that.105
Indeed, this is a major reason why the use of character evidence has
long been subjected to far-reaching limitations under general evidence
law principles.106 Nor can community-representing juries be counted on
to avoid improper condemnation of political and social dissidents. The
radical nature of the speech of such persons, after all, almost certainly
will brand them as outliers within the very communities from which
jurors are drawn. To be sure, some community members may share or
sympathize with the worldviews of steely-edged naysayers. The more
likely it is that prospective jurors do so, however, the more likely it is
that they will be excluded from jury service from the outset through
the use of peremptory strikes.
Most important of all, to the extent that speech-driven, characterrelated considerations improperly come into play in the course of the
jury’s work, the burden placed on protected speech is both obvious and
profound. The difficulty, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once
declared, is that “defendants are to be made to suffer not for what the
indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow.”107 Professor Quint
captures this concern in these words:
Whenever evidence of unpopular but protected speech or association
is introduced against a criminal defendant, the jury may make
improper use of that evidence by penalizing the exercise of First
Amendment rights. In a criminal trial, the jury as a constituent of the
court exercises the power of the state. Hence, the improper
penalization of protected speech by a jury violates the First

105. See Quint, supra note 2, at 1648 n.81, 1666 (developing the point that
“limiting . . . instructions are ineffective as a prophylactic technique,” and quoting Justice
Jackson’s observation that “[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction” (quoting
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring))). See generally
Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 37 (1985) (discussing how juries use criminal-record evidence against defendants, even
when such evidence is designed only to impeach a witness’s credibility).
106. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note (highlighting that rules on
character evidence are “deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence” and that such evidence faces
limitations because it has “slight probative value and may be very prejudicial”; and further,
emphasizing that character evidence “tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of
what actually happened . . . [and] subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to
punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what . . . actually happened”).
107. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Amendment to the same extent as analogous action by any other
governmental entity.108

The essential idea is that the use at trial of past-speech evidence
often creates a perilously high danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant—unfair in the sense that the factfinder may well consider
the evidence for reasons that go beyond its proper use as evidence, thus
disadvantaging the defendant because of protected beliefs,
associations, or statements. In other words, the introduction of pastspeech evidence places a burden on speech by threatening to generate
an improperly obtained conviction. Indeed, the inherent tendency of
past-speech evidence to prejudice the defendant means that all cases
involving its use present the very same danger highlighted in Dawson—
namely, that decisions adverse to criminal defendants will be driven by
reasons that should have “no bearing on the issue being tried.”109
B. Convictions Based on “Fair Prejudice”
As the foregoing analysis suggests, Professor Quint focuses on the
danger of “unfair prejudice” in arguing for careful judicial review of
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence. So, too, do other analysts.110
The risk of unfair prejudice arises because of the possibility that the
factfinder may rely on part of the prosecutor’s evidentiary submission
in a way that is inconsistent with the rules of evidence. But
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence presents an additional
problem: Even when that evidence is not unfairly put to work, it still
operates to establish the defendant’s guilt, particularly when the
defendant otherwise might have been found not guilty. As a result, the
government’s actions cause the defendant’s past engagement in wholly
protected speech to operate to the extreme detriment of the defendant.
Thus, earlier critics of wide-open use of past-speech evidence have
missed, or at least underemphasized, a significant point: the use of past-

108. Quint, supra note 2, at 1641.
109. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992). To be sure, some analysts may argue that
prosecutorial use of “unfairly prejudicial” evidence with some, though perhaps only minimal,
relevance is more justifiable than the use of “unfairly prejudicial” evidence that, as the majority
seemed to see things in Dawson, fails to cross the relevance line. But regardless of this point, the
burden placed on the defendant’s speech in both cases is the same—that is, the disadvantage that
arises because the jury may rely on that speech for unfairly prejudicial, and thus impermissible,
purposes.
110. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 324–26 (2005); Faulkner, supra note 5, at 20 (“[B]y far the greatest danger
is that the truth-seeking function . . . will be compromised . . . .”).
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speech evidence burdens expression rights even if a jury considers it in
wholly Simon-pure fashion—that is, in a way that is entirely proper for
the purposes of evidence law standing alone.
To review the basics, only relevant evidence is admissible at trial.
Thus, the admission of past-speech evidence necessarily means that the
judge has found it to be probative as to some factual issue in the case.
As a result, to the extent that a factfinder considers the evidence only
in resolving that issue, the factfinder will not have used the evidence in
a way that is unfairly prejudicial. Even in these circumstances,
however, past speech is being used against the defendant, and for this
reason prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence is problematic “in and
of itself.”111 In other words, one burden on expression that arises from
the use of past-speech evidence involves what might be called “fair
prejudice,” and this burden is borne by defendants in two separate
ways. First, the fair-prejudice burden arises because prosecutorial and
judicial actions put the past-speech evidence before the jury for the
very purpose of inviting the jury to view that evidence as tending to
show the defendant’s guilt. In other words, the Government’s use of
the evidence is bad for the defendant, and that bad result arises only
because the defendant engaged in protected speech in the past.
Second, in some cases, the use of past-speech evidence—even in
the absence of unfair prejudice—burdens the defendant in the most
profound of ways because it proves decisive to the jury’s finding of
guilt. In these cases, use of the evidence stands in the starkest tension
with the core First Amendment principle that, when the government
considers taking action against an individual, that individual “should
not have the . . . question resolved against him because of
constitutionally protected conduct.”112 The difficulty is apparent. If
past-speech evidence is the straw that breaks the camel’s back in
generating a successful prosecution, the government will have secured
the defendant’s punishment because of the defendant’s past protected
speech in a direct and obvious sense.113 By definition, after all, but-for
causation is present when one thing—here, the submission of pastspeech evidence—is decisive in bringing about a particular outcome—
here, the conviction of the defendant.
111. Dennis, supra note 4, at 40.
112. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977).
113. Put another way, in such a case, the conviction not only “may have rested on a form of
expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution tolerates and protects.” Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969). Instead, in such a case, the conviction does rest on such expression
in a decisive, but-for sense.
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To be sure, for almost all lawyers and judges, it would be too
extreme to say that this but-for-causation problem requires in all cases
the exclusion of relevant past-speech evidence. But that does not
change the fact that this but-for-causation problem exists. To be sure,
many judges may deem the burden that arises from the fair-prejudice
effects of using past-speech evidence—including its potential but-forcausation effects—to be less worrisome than the burden that arises
from the risk of unfair prejudice. Even if that view of things is sound,
however, the fair-prejudice problem is real. And as a result, the fairprejudice burden on speech should count for something—and perhaps
count significantly—when courts work to accommodate individual
rights and societal needs as the two come into conflict in this set of
cases.
C. Chilling Effects
A third burden imposed by prosecutors’ leveraging of past-speech
evidence involves chilling effects. In particular, using public-concern
speech as inculpatory evidence threatens to stifle such speech not only
by criminal defendants themselves, but also by social outsiders of all
stripes. Notably, the chilling-effects problem posed by authorizing the
use of speech as evidence is very different from the problem posed by
the direct prohibition of communicative activity. This is so because a
person who makes statements that are themselves entirely legal may
be slow to consider the prospect that those statements could be used as
inculpatory evidence in a later proceeding that does not involve
prosecution for the statements themselves. The Court made this very
point in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, deeming it “speculative” to assume that
a would-be speaker might think through things in this way.114 The
following examination of Mitchell, however, reveals that the problem
analyzed by the Court in that case was so specialized and distinct that
it should not bear on formulating constitutional rules concerning the
admissibility of past-speech evidence.
In particular, the Court in Mitchell confronted a facial challenge
to a statute that required sentence enhancements for crimes motivated
by bias regarding the victim’s “race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry.”115 The case did not present
any issue regarding the propriety of introducing speech-based evidence
at trial to prove a prohibited discriminatory intent or to prove anything
114. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
115. Id. at 480.
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else. Instead, the defendant in Mitchell argued that chilling-effects
concerns, coupled with the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
required invalidation of the challenged sentencing-enhancement law as
a whole because some prosecutors might sometimes invoke the law to
support the introduction of past-speech evidence about a defendant’s
biased views.116 Put another way, Mitchell involved an attack on each
and every application of a substantive criminal restriction—indeed, a
very common form of substantive restriction—based on an effort,
novel in the extreme, to extend the overbreadth doctrine.117 One might
even go so far as to conclude that the Court in Mitchell did nothing
more than reach the most predictable of results— namely, by
determining that the potential use of past-speech evidence in some
cases does not warrant the wholesale invalidation of all forms of state
and federal antidiscrimination laws.118 In any event, the Court never
suggested that actual prosecutorial use in an actual case of politically
or socially charged past-speech evidence creates no risk whatsoever of
generating problematic chilling effects.
Nor should it have. As noted earlier, the Court in Mitchell
observed that outright prohibitions on speech generate greater
chilling-effect problems than trial-process rules under which utterances
made today might be used as evidence sometime in the future.119 But
that does not mean that the evidentiary use of protected speech creates
no chilling effects at all.120 At least some potential speakers
contemplate the risk of future evidentiary use of their statements,
especially if they are repeat players in the criminal justice system or
already enmeshed in litigation. Others may hesitate to engage in
boundary-pushing commentary because of a generalized, but still
accurate, wariness that legal disadvantages lie in wait for agitators who
116. Id. at 488.
117. The argument was novel in the extreme because the overbreadth doctrine authorizes the
facial invalidation of a statute when “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional”
in comparison to its “legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). In
Mitchell, however, the challenger did not argue that the hate-crime law was overbroad in this
traditional sense. Instead, he argued that the statute was rightly viewed as overbroad because it
might have the practical effect of causing the introduction into evidence of protected-speech
activity, even if the statute itself outlawed only properly proscribable behavior. See supra note
116 and accompanying text.
118. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (reasoning that hate-crime laws are not functionally
distinguishable from other antidiscrimination statutes).
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. See Nickerson, supra note 6, at 871 (noting, in this regard, that “the absence of empirical
evidence of a chilling effect” has not negated the Court’s recognition of such effects); Quint, supra
note 2, at 1645–46 (developing the same point).
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do not hold their tongues. And that generalized wariness might well
emanate in part from prosecutorial use of past speech as evidence.
Chilling effects may be particularly acute for specialized
communities of speakers. In recent years, for example, the use of rap
lyrics as evidence has generated widespread media coverage.121 Thus,
the risk arises that some rap artists will water down the edginess of their
lyrics because they know those lyrics might later be used as evidence
against them. Indeed, other legal analysts (who know much more about
rap music than I do) have concluded that this risk is very real.122
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that thoughtful
commentators—including First Amendment luminary Thomas I.
Emerson—have concluded that the evidentiary use of past speech
causes problematic chilling effects.123 Moreover, the danger presented

121. See, e.g., Adam Dunbar, Rap on Trial: Do Violent Lyrics Prove a Crime, CRIME REP.
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/07/rap-on-trial-do-violent-lyrics-prove-a-crime
[https://perma.cc/M2RT-E4NF]; Lorne Manly, Legal Debate on Using Boastful Rap Lyrics as a
Smoking Gun, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/arts/music/
using-rap-lyrics-as-damning-evidence-stirs-legal-debate.html
[https://perma.cc/DZ9X-SF4X];
Erik Nielson, ‘Rap on Trial’: Why Lyrics Should Be Off-Limits, ROLLING STONE (May 3, 2017,
8:05 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/rap-on-trial-why-lyrics-should-beoff-limits-116368 [https://perma.cc/ELB5-R8L3]; Alyssa Rosenberg, How Cops and Prosecutors
are Putting Rap Music on Trial, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/act-four/wp/2014/05/21/how-cops-and-prosecutors-are-putting-rap-music-on-trial/?utm
_term=.cf831aa761b1 [https://perma.cc/7TMJ-9H9S]; Kay Wicker, Amateur Rap Lyrics Are Being
Used as Evidence Across the Country, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 1, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://thinkprogress.org/rap-lyrics-evidence-texas-acb3870f7d2c [https://perma.cc/QS7R-JRSV].
122. See Dennis, supra note 4, at 5, 40 (noting the “negative impact [that use of rap music as
evidence] will have on the production and quality of art”); Jason E. Powell, Note, R.A.P.: Rule
Against Perps (Who Write Rhymes), 41 RUTGERS L.J. 479, 499 (2009) (citing views of practicing
lawyers that “using rap lyrics as evidence will . . . lead to mundane, unprovocative art”); id. at
515–16 (“When courts use creative devices as evidence of their creator’s knowledge or intent to
commit a crime, the result is a chilling effect . . . [including] a chilling effect on the rap music
genre.”).
123. Emerson describes the problem of chilling effects as follows:
[E]xpression may be seriously inhibited when the speaker knows that what he says can
be used against him at a later time if some unforeseen action ensues, can be taken into
account by a jury in determining his state of mind in performing a subsequent act, or
can perhaps be the decisive factor in a jury’s general verdict against him.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 405 (1970). See also Anderson,
supra note 5, at 902 (urging that “the potential for a chilling effect on listeners’ rights under the
First Amendment” based on the compelled provision of evidence “is very real”); Faulkner, supra
note 5, at 12; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41
VAND. L. REV. 879, 890 (1988) (citing the prospect of individuals’ fears that “constitutionally
protected statements would come back later to haunt them”); Nickerson, supra note 6, at 847;
Quint, supra note 2, at 1645–46 (noting chilling-effect concerns); Note, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 894 (1970) (same); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
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by these effects has risen significantly in recent decades with the
explosion of modern communications technologies. One effect of those
technologies is particularly significant: acts of expression today
routinely take place on the Internet and are thus locked into a
retrievable form. In similar fashion, even brief rants can be captured
on cellphones and similar easy-to-use devices. The making of speech in
such permanently recorded ways thus allows present-day prosecutors
to discover and deploy past-speech evidence much more readily than
prosecutors of the past.124 And this reality compounds the risk that
would-be speakers will be deterred from engaging in full-throated
dissent precisely because they know their words might well become
available for use by the government, including as evidence, at a later
time.
None of this means that under present conditions most Internet
speakers steer clear of sharing extremist views in forms they otherwise
would freely use. That is neither the case nor the point. The point
instead is that there is reason to conclude that some speakers hold back
in some circumstances to some degree, in part because what they say
might later be used as evidence against them. This effect, in turn,
strikes at the heart of the First Amendment because it involves the
suppression of protected speech. Notably, the Court has never required
a detailed empirical showing of the fact or the extent of these sorts of
chilling effects. Instead, it has simply used its own common sense in
concluding that certain forms of government action might well deter
wide-open engagement in protected expression.125 That same approach
suggests that, in this context, chilling-effect concerns have a role to play
as courts decide how to handle past-speech evidence.

Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 926 n.325 (1970) (same). For some judicial treatments, see
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 169 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting “the potential
chilling effect that consideration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might have”) and
United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘chilling’ concerns” resulting
from evidentiary use “are especially powerful where political speech is involved”). But see
Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (downplaying any “potential chilling
effect”).
124. See Dennis, supra note 4, at 40–41 (emphasizing the “exceedingly public” nature of the
Internet and that “[l]aw enforcement and prosecutors will train their sights on . . . widely
accessible types of creative expression”).
125. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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III. FREE SPEECH, EVIDENCE, AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS
As the foregoing discussion shows, prosecutorial use of pastspeech evidence places a burden—indeed, a complex, multipart
burden—on protected expression. Even so, perhaps this burden should
not give rise to any meaningful constitutional restraint. Part I of this
Article shows, for example, that lower courts have read Dawson to
foreclose the imposition of First Amendment limits on the use of
relevant past-speech evidence.126 But Part I also demonstrates that this
reading of Dawson is misguided.127 Is there another line of argument
that thoughtful prosecutors might put forward as they urge courts to
allow the use of all relevant past-speech evidence? One can imagine an
argument that builds on the idea that generally applicable evidence law
is not subject to Free Speech Clause challenges precisely because it is
generally applicable in character. After all, generally applicable laws
are, in their nature, far removed from laws that target speech itself. Of
particular importance, the widespread operation of such laws,
including against nonspeakers, provides assurance that the government
put them in place for salutary reasons wholly unrelated to the
burdening of constitutionally protected rights.
The poster child for this line of reasoning is Employment Division
v. Smith.128 There, the Court relied on the generally applicable
character of the law at issue to reject an as-applied Free Exercise
Clause challenge to a ban on the use of peyote, which the individual
who raised the challenge had ingested as a sacramental act.129 And
Smith does not stand alone. The Court has relied on the generally
applicable character of challenged laws to resist their invalidation in a
number of cases that did not involve the Free Exercise Clause.130 None
of this would matter if the Court had made clear that its hands-off
treatment of generally applicable laws in other contexts had no role
whatsoever to play in free-speech cases. But in one earlier case, Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co.,131 the Court suggested—albeit both
controversially and confusingly—that the generally applicable

126. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text.
128. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
129. Id.
130. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194 (1983) (applying the Contracts Clause);
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976) (refusing to apply heightened Equal
Protection Clause scrutiny solely because of a law’s minority-disadvantaging effects).
131. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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character of a challenged law might, at least sometimes, exempt it from
constitutional free-expression-based challenge.132
These authorities provide ammunition for those who believe that
prosecutorial use of relevant past-speech proof should be allowed—
with no constitutional limits—because evidence law is generally
applicable in character. Evidence law, after all, does not target speech.
Instead, it deals with all forms of evidence. In addition, the purposes of
evidence rules have nothing to do with “the suppression of free
expression”;133 rather, those rules focus on ensuring the fair, orderly,
and well-informed resolution of factual disputes.134
Further, the law of evidence is generally applicable in a special
way. The typical generally applicable law, such as the peyote ban at
issue in Smith, has a one-way-street quality in that it imposes burdens
that do not extend to the government. Put differently, such a law
exposes only ordinary citizens to the limits and sanctions the
government has imposed. The law of evidence, in contrast,
simultaneously benefits and burdens both ordinary citizens and the
government itself—for instance, by subjecting all parties in any trial to
the rule that all relevant evidence is presumptively admissible against
them. This dynamic might cause courts to hesitate to place First
Amendment limits on the operation of evidence rules in a way that
disadvantages only the State. Those judges might reason that given the
two-way-street nature of the law of evidence, it is inappropriate to
install a one-way-street constitutional restriction that limits the
prerogatives only of government prosecutors.135 At the very least, some

132. Id. at 672. A later discussion of the Cohen case shows why this reading of it, even if
superficially plausible, is unjustifiable. See infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
133. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
134. In addition, some policy reasons that support the Court’s ruling in Smith seem applicable
in the past-speech-evidence context. Just as in Smith, applying a bright-line rule, based on the
doctrine of generally applicable laws, would ease the decision-making task in this context. A
bright-line rule would also make it less likely that judges would smuggle personal considerations
into the decision-making process. Indeed, one might say that the Smith principle should control,
a fortiori, questions concerning the admissibility of past-speech evidence. On this view, Mr.
Smith’s spiritually inspired peyote use was itself the gravamen of the charged criminal offense. In
free-expression-evidence cases, on the other hand, speech comes before the factfinder as just “one
link in the long chain of evidence.” See Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001).
135. For a similar line of analysis advanced by Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Richard A.
Nagareda regarding the Compulsory Process Clause, see infra note 141. Notably, however, the
Amar-Nagareda position has been rejected by the Supreme Court. See id. Also cutting against
this line of analysis is the practical reality that some evidence rules—such as the coconspiratordeclaration exception to the hearsay rule—apply overwhelmingly to the disadvantage of criminal
defendants, and other evidence rules discriminate on their face against defendants and in favor of
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judges might say, the only properly recognized constitutional limit in
this field should focus—à la Dawson—on evidentiary relevance,
because such a limit reinforces, rather than undermines, the longrecognized generally applicable principle that all relevant proof is
presumptively admissible at trial.136
This line of argument may have surface appeal. But it suffers from
a fatal flaw. The problem is that the two-way-street argument fails to
take account of the full body of the Court’s jurisprudence on generally
applicable law. and the policy concerns that have driven the Court’s
key precedents on general applicability. Indeed, four separate
components of the Court’s doctrine undermine the position that pastspeech evidence should be admissible, despite First Amendment
protections, because of the generally applicable nature of evidence law:
(1) the Court’s past declaration that laws challenged on free-speech
grounds—in contrast to laws challenged on free-exercise grounds, as in
Smith—are not immune from constitutional attack because of their
generally applicable character;137 (2) the Court’s particular insistence
that judicial review should be more exacting when generally applicable
laws place “direct-in-effect” burdens—as opposed to merely
“incidental” burdens—on protected speech;138 (3) the Court’s
insistence, even in the Smith case, that otherwise operative limits on
judicial review do not apply when the challenged law, even though
generally applicable, requires “individualized” governmental
determinations about “eligibility” issues;139 and (4) the Court’s
longstanding endorsement of speech-protective “First Amendment

the Government. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1967) (detailing
special limits on the use of admissions of government agents in criminal proceedings).
136. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402.
137. See infra Part III.A. Putting to one side the Court’s ruling in the Cohen case, see infra
notes 147–53 and accompanying text, there is one arguable exception to the proposition that laws
burdening free speech are not immune from constitutional challenge merely because of their
general applicability. The relevant limitation was recognized in a line of cases culminating in
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986). There, the Court dealt with the application to a
bookstore of a municipal ordinance that mandated a year-long closure of any business site on
which “sexual activity” had occurred. Id. at 699. The Court held that this law was not subject to
any form of First Amendment review. Id. at 707. The Court’s reasoning was that the target of the
government’s action was the lewd conduct—here, largely prostitution—which had “nothing to do
with books or other expressive activity.” Id. In contrast, the burden that is placed on the
defendant-declarant in past-speech-evidence cases stems directly from that individual’s past
engagement in protected speech itself. Accordingly, Arcara is beside the point here.
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. See infra Part III.C.
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due process” restrictions, including in cases that involve the
Government’s use of evidence.140
It merits emphasis that none of these four means of avoiding
Smith’s general-applicability reasoning is farfetched in this context;
indeed, each one has its origins in settled precedent and has much to
be said in its favor. Even more important, the underlying reasons that
have given rise to each of the lines of precedent support the case for
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny of past-speech evidence. In sum,
four already-established bodies of general-applicability doctrine,
especially when viewed as a whole, offer powerful justifications for
imposing significant constitutional limits on the evidentiary use of past
protected expression.141

140. See infra Part III.D.
141. There is a fifth line of cases—distinguishable from the four discussed in the text because
it has no direct connection to the First Amendment—that supports this same pro-defendant view.
In these cases, the Supreme Court has held that judges sometimes must override generally
applicable evidence rules related to privilege, hearsay, and the like, so as to admit otherwise
inadmissible evidence and thereby vindicate the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. 2
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES § 11.2.1 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 3d ed. 2017). Illustrative is the extent to which
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compel attendance of “witnesses in his favor” trumps
generally applicable evidence law limits that render certain forms of testimony inadmissible.
Some distinguished commentators argue that courts should rebuff Sixth Amendment claims along
these lines so long as the nonconstitutional evidence law rule in question applies in generally
applicable fashion to limit equally the testimony-presenting prerogatives of both criminal
defendants and prosecutors. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO.
L.J. 641, 699 (1996) (“If the government cannot compel a doctor to testify against his patient,
because of a general doctor-patient privilege, a defendant cannot so compel this doctor.”);
Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1069
(1999) (arguing “that a wide array of sources . . . form a compelling case to reconceive the right
[to compel witness attendance] as one of equal treatment”). The Court, however, has rejected this
approach, holding instead that generally applicable evidence rules, including rules on privilege
and hearsay, must sometimes give way to ensure the vindication of the defendant’s constitutional
rights. See IMWINKELRIED, supra, § 11.2.1; accord id. § 11.2.2. (noting that under the Court’s
rulings, “criminal defense counsel now have a constitutional argument for overriding exclusionary
rules in the form of statutes, common law decisions, or court rules” in light of “the
constitutionalization of the accused’s right to present defense evidence” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, the Court’s approach makes sense. After all, as a noted treatise writer explains,
“many of the constitutional provisions impacting evidence are found in the Bill of Rights; and
rather than implementing an equality model, the essential thrust of the Bill of Rights is to impose
special restrictions on the government.” Id. § 11.4.1; see id. § 11.3.2 (adding that it is “clear that
the courts ought to employ as-applied analysis in adjudicating the constitutionality of evidentiary
rules attacked under the accused’s constitutional right to present evidence”). The bottom line is
that under governing Supreme Court doctrine, the Sixth Amendment sometimes requires
departure from “purportedly absolute” common law or statutory rules of evidence law. Id. § 11.3–
11.3.1. And if such departures are required by the Sixth Amendment, one is left to ask why they
should not likewise be required by the First.
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A. O’Brien and Generally Applicable Rules of Evidence
As discussed above, some judges might seek to immunize evidence
law from as-applied First Amendment attacks because of its generally
applicable character. There is, however, a front-and-center problem
with this line of analysis. In contrast to its approach to free-exercise
cases, the Court long has refused to apply a rule of automatic validation
to generally applicable laws in the Free Speech Clause context.
This story begins with United States v. O’Brien. There, the Court
upheld the conviction of a draft-card-burning war protester under a law
that, in generally applicable fashion, prohibited the mutilation of
documents issued by the Selective Service System.142 Taking an
approach fundamentally different from that in Smith, the Justices did
not reject the defendant’s constitutional challenge simply because the
mutilation ban was generally applicable in character. Instead, the
Court undertook a case-specific balancing analysis, inquiring whether
the government interests offered in support of the statute qualified as
“substantial” and whether there existed an adequate “less restrictive”
alternative for advancing those interests.143 In short, the Court directed
what it later described as an “intermediate level of scrutiny” at the
speech-specific application of the statute to the defendant.144 Notably,
O’Brien does not stand alone in applying this form of heightened
scrutiny to generally applicable laws. In later cases—including
controversial post-Smith cases involving the claimed free-speech rights
of nude dancers—the Court has continued to apply this intermediatescrutiny style of review to Free Speech Clause challenges directed at
generally applicable laws.145

142. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968).
143. Id. at 380–82.
144. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994).
145. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), for example, the Court encountered
a challenge to a generally applicable ban on nudity in public places, as applied to erotic dancers
who performed at nightclubs. Id. at 563. All nine Justices accepted the premise that nude dancing
is protected speech. See id. at 565–66 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 580–81 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 587–88
(White, J., dissenting). Having joined the Court in doing so, however, Justice Scalia went on to
urge the Court to abandon the O’Brien approach in light of Smith, thus rendering the nudity ban
automatically immune from First Amendment challenge because of the law’s general
applicability. Id. at 579–80 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (advocating the same approach). Every
other member of the Court, however, employed the O’Brien methodology. See Dan T. Coenen,
Free Speech and Generally Applicable Laws: A New Doctrinal Synthesis, 103 IOWA L. REV. 435,
473–74 (2018).
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There is, however, more to the story because of the Court’s
opinion in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.146 There, Justice
Kennedy asserted that, under present-day doctrine, “a generally
applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under
the First Amendment.”147 In support of this seeming retreat from
O’Brien, however, Justice Kennedy cited only one case, Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.148 In that case, the Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a promissory-estoppel-based damages
judgment entered against a reporter who had breached an agreement
to keep secret a source’s identity.149 Moreover, in doing so, the Court
emphasized that the state promissory-estoppel law was “generally
applicable” in nature.150 As Professor Eugene Volokh properly
explains, however, the Court focused on the generally applicable
character of promissory-estoppel law in rebuffing a Free Press Clause
argument—rather than a Free Speech Clause argument—advanced by
the defendant-reporter.151 In other words, the Court ruled that the
general applicability of the promissory-estoppel cause of action meant
that the reporter, regardless of his role as a member of the press, was
entitled to no greater First Amendment protection from liability for
promise-breaking than any other promise-breaking speaker. As for
any separate Free Speech Clause challenge, Volokh further (and again
soundly) explains that the Court’s ruling was extremely narrow.152 At
most, it held that the reporter, precisely because he promised not to
communicate the source’s identity, had voluntarily waived any Free
Speech Clause right he otherwise might have been able to invoke to
escape the state’s restriction on speech.153
The foregoing analysis signals that O’Brien’s intermediatescrutiny approach remains fully operational in cases that involve freespeech challenges to the generally applicable law of evidence
because—to say the least—involuntarily becoming a criminal

146. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)
147. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
148. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (cited in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512
U.S. at 640).
149. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665–66, 672.
150. Id. at 670.
151. Volokh, supra note 71, at 1294–96.
152. Id. at 1297.
153. Id. For a far more detailed analysis, see Coenen, Free Speech and Generally Applicable
Laws, supra note 145, at 468–73. As is concluded in that work, “a waiver theory best explains the
Court’s treatment of the free-speech issue in Cohen.” Id. at 472.
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defendant does not bespeak a voluntary waiver of one’s Free Speech
Clause rights. Thus, there is good reason to conclude that the O’Brien
test, or at least some form of O’Brien-style scrutiny, should apply in
past-speech-evidence cases. To be sure, judicial use of an O’Brien-type
test in this context does not ensure that courts applying the test will
conclude that it requires the exclusion of relevant past-speech
evidence. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the O’Brien
standard has proven so toothless in actual operation that it affords no
meaningful protection to speakers in any context at all.154 This
depiction, however, overstates the limitations of O’Brien-style review.
The key point is that the O’Brien standard requires courts to apply a
level of scrutiny described by the Court as “intermediate,” and the
Court has invoked intermediate scrutiny in many cases to limit the
operation of speech-burdening laws.155
So, why has the Court refused to overrule its Free Speech Clause
ruling in O’Brien in the wake of its subsequent Free Exercise Clause
ruling in Smith? The basic reason is that judicial protection of an
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” freedom of expression lies at the
heart of our democratic system.156 And the sort of expression involved
in past-speech-evidence cases puts that concern at its zenith precisely
because those cases involve the burdening of speech on matters of
public concern.157 For this reason, past-speech-evidence cases raise
very different considerations than, say, the nude-dancing cases in which
the Court found no violation of the O’Brien test.
No less important, past-speech-evidence cases present a more
compelling claim for judicial intervention than even O’Brien itself in
one significant respect. As others have noted, the speaker in O’Brien
had many ways to communicate his message without burning his draft
card—including by decrying the Vietnam War in front of the very same
sympathetic crowd, while burning an exact replica of his draft card.158
In contrast, when drug-use-celebrating “trap rap” artists find
154. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech
and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 945 (1993).
155. See Coenen, supra note 145, at 474.
156. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Coenen, Free Speech
and Generally Applicable Laws, supra note 145, at 466–67 (developing this idea).
157. See supra notes 73–91 and accompanying text. Another distinction arises out of the
special concern—prominently reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the religion
clauses—about ensuring that government institutions take a neutral view of religious institutions
and practices. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); see also Coenen, Free Speech
and Generally Applicable Laws, supra note 145, at 466 (developing this distinction).
158. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 983 (2d ed. 1988).
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themselves pressured to water down song lyrics, something more
problematic is occurring. This is the case because any such watering
down involves altering the words of their songs and thus the content of
their intended messages. Indeed, such an alteration might even cause
the substituted lyrics no longer qualify as trap rap at all.
In sum, notwithstanding the Court’s hands-off free-exercise ruling
in Smith, the hands-on, free-speech-protective ruling in O’Brien
remains good law, and it is applicable in the context of past-speech
evidence in a particularly powerful way. As is discussed below, a form
of judicial scrutiny even stricter than the one recognized in O’Brien
might well properly apply to prosecutorial use of criminal defendants’
past-speech evidence. At a minimum, however, O’Brien signals that
the operation of evidence rules should have to survive a meaningful
form of judicial review, notwithstanding their generally applicable
character, when the Government seeks to use those rules to introduce
past-speech proof against criminal defendants.
B. Past-Speech Evidence and Direct-in-Effect Burdens on Expression
Another line of Free Speech Clause authority confirms that judges
should thoughtfully police prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence,
whether or not it is relevant. This doctrine teaches that a generally
applicable law requires especially “demanding” scrutiny159 when its
application imposes not just an O’Brien-type “incidental” burden on
speech, but a burden that qualifies as direct in effect.160
This point is illustrated by Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,161
which involved an as-applied Free Speech Clause challenge to a federal
statute that prohibited the provision of “material support” to any
government-listed terrorist group.162 Following this statute’s
enactment, a nonprofit organization sued to block the law’s operation
to the extent that it precluded the organization from training a terrorist
group’s members about peaceably pursuing the group’s underlying
aims.163 According to the organization, this application of the law
violated the First Amendment because the training the organization
sought to engage in plainly involved protected speech.164 The

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
The phrase “direct in effect” is my own.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 10, 14.
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Government’s counterargument centered on the claim that the statute
was subject to, and satisfied, the O’Brien test.165 In its view, the
material-support law qualified as generally applicable because most of
its applications—for example, to defendants charged with transferring
weapons or cash to terrorists—did not involve training or other forms
of expression.166 Thus, according to the Government, the applicable
legal standard was O’Brien’s speech-control-friendly intermediatescrutiny test.
The Court, however, concluded that Humanitarian Law Project
differed from O’Brien in a key respect.167 As the Court observed, the
speech of the draft-card burner in O’Brien had nothing to do with
establishing the elements of the charged crime.168 Put another way,
conduct in the form of draft-card mutilation was criminalized, for one
and for all, entirely apart from anyone’s engagement in that conduct as
expression.169 In Humanitarian Law Project, however, free-speech
values were threatened to a greater extent because it was the
nonprofit’s planned expressive activity itself—that is, its
communication of information through the expressive activity of
teaching—that gave rise to the very “material support” that the statute
banned in its application to the case.170 Thus, the Court concluded, the
material-support statute imposed a direct-in-effect, not just incidental,
burden on this particular would-be speaker.171 This conclusion, in turn,
led the Court to apply a mode of review to the as-applied challenge
that was “more demanding” than the intermediate-scrutiny approach
of O’Brien.172 In the end, the Court in Humanitarian Law Project
upheld the challenged statute—hardly a surprising result because the
justification underlying the statute focused on the distinctly powerful
government interest of thwarting international terrorism. The key
point here, however, is that the Court was crystal clear in holding that
165. Id. at 26.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 27.
168. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968) (cited in Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. at 26–27).
169. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82.
170. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27–28.
171. See id. at 4 (reasoning that “the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consist[ed]
of communicating a message”).
172. Id. at 27–28. Notably, this approach was far from unprecedented. In Humanitarian Law
Project itself, the Court relied on earlier cases involving close scrutiny of breach-of-the-peace
statutes as applied to protected speech. See id. (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971)).
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the type of as-applied challenge raised in such cases requires a much
stricter form of judicial scrutiny than was operative in O’Brien.
Thus, a critical question arises: When courts apply the rules of
evidence to allow a defendant’s past profession of radical political
beliefs or the like to be presented to the jury, are those rules operating
more like the draft-card-burning law at issue in O’Brien or more like
the material-support statute at issue in Humanitarian Law Project? The
answer is that evidence rules are operating more like the materialsupport statute. After all, just as in Humanitarian Law Project, the
Government in past-speech-evidence cases seeks to use against
defendants the expressive characteristics of their past speech. In other
words, the speaker-disadvantaging impact generated by the
problematic evidence arises precisely because of—and not, as in
O’Brien, in spite of—the fact that the defendant’s actions involve
communicating particular information or ideas to others. Thus, when
the Government uses past-speech evidence against a defendantdeclarant, it is doing so specifically because of “the content . . . of the
message conveyed,”173 in the critical sense that “the content of the
message” is precisely what gives the message probative power for the
prosecutor’s case. The burden placed on speakers through the
evidentiary use of their past speech is therefore far different—because
it is far more direct—than the burden placed on the speaker in O’Brien.
It thus seems fair to conclude that past-speech-evidence cases call for
an even-more-than-intermediate-scrutiny mode of constitutional
review, in keeping with the logic of Humanitarian Law Project.
C. Past-Speech Evidence and Sherbert
Both O’Brien and Humanitarian Law Project show that limits on
the ability to challenge generally applicable laws on constitutional
grounds do not apply to Free Speech Clause cases. But even if Smith
were taken to immunize generally applicable laws from free-exercise
and free-speech challenges, the Smith Court itself recognized an
important exception to the rule of immunity it established. This
exception emanated from the Court’s earlier free-exercise ruling in
Sherbert v. Verner. And, as the following discussion indicates, the
policy concerns that drove the Smith Court to recognize the Sherbert
exception apply with great force in the past-speech-evidence context
considered in this Article.

173. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457 (2011).
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Sherbert arose out of a sincere Sabbatarian’s free-exercise
challenge to the state’s refusal to grant her unemploymentcompensation benefits after she lost her job because she refused to
work on Saturdays.174 The State argued that the case presented no freeexercise problem because refusals to work for “personal reasons,”
whether religious or not, precluded the award of unemployment
benefits.175 In other words, the State’s theory was that Ms. Sherbert
could not mount a free-exercise challenge to the program’s eligibility
rules because of their generally applicable character.
In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court disagreed,
reasoning that “any incidental burden on the free exercise of
appellant’s religion” must be “justified by a ‘compelling state
interest.’”176 Twenty-seven years later, the Court had the chance to
overrule Sherbert in Smith. But it declined to do so. Instead, the Court
concluded that its newly minted prohibition on free-exercise scrutiny
of generally applicable laws did not extend to Sherbert-like cases.177
According to Justice Scalia, this exception to the Smith rule made sense
because “the Sherbert test . . . was developed in a context that lent itself
to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the
relevant conduct.”178 In other words, state decisionmakers had to
consider, as a matter of state law, a variety of “eligibility criteria” in
connection with “the particular circumstances behind an applicant’s
unemployment” in each individual case.179 In sum, Sherbert, as recast
in Smith, establishes the principle that “where the State has in place a
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”180
Smith’s treatment of Sherbert raises an important question: Even
assuming that evidence rules might otherwise be subject to Smith’s
line-in-the-sand limit on First Amendment challenges to generally
applicable laws, does the Smith limit or the Sherbert exception to that
174. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
175. Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
177. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990).
178. Id. at 884.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citation omitted). Notably, lower courts have applied the Sherbert exception in a
wide range of settings far removed from the unemployment-compensation context. See, e.g., Ward
v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying such an exception to a university policy
regarding counselor reassignments); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the exception to a police-department policy
that banned beards).
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limit properly apply when defendants challenge prosecutorial use of
past-speech evidence? The answer to this question hinges on the policy
concerns that underlie the Court’s treatment of Sherbert in Smith. And
those policy concerns favor recognition of an analogous “expressive
hardship” exception to otherwise generally applicable rules of
evidence.
To begin with, if determinations made by the government ever
“invite consideration of the particular circumstances” or “an
individualized governmental assessment . . . of reasons,”181 they do so
in the context of judicial rulings on the admissibility of evidence. After
all, each and every evidentiary ruling is uniquely based on the
particular evidence offered and the overall context into which it fits. In
addition, the law of evidence establishes “eligibility criteria” in a key,
functional sense. For relevant evidence to be eligible for admission
under the Federal Rules, for example, it must not be unduly
prejudicial, must be nonprivileged, and must not be subject to
exclusion as hearsay or improper character evidence.
Indeed, a straightforward logical argument is available based on
the Court’s declaration in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,182 building on Smith and Sherbert, that a state “may not
refuse . . . without compelling reason” to recognize a constitutional
hardship exception “in circumstances in which individualized
exemptions from a general requirement are available.”183 In the pastspeech-evidence context, a “general requirement” dictates that
relevant evidence is admissible. But there exist many “individualized
exemptions” to that rule that are triggered by privileges, hearsay limits,
and the like. Thus, it seems to follow that courts “may not refuse” to
apply a First Amendment exception to the relevance rule “without
compelling reason.”184
What is more, there is a special justification for carrying over
Sherbert’s “individual government assessment” principle to pastspeech-evidence cases. In these cases, courts are very likely to find
themselves assessing the prejudicial effect of the proffered speech
evidence in any event. In our bombing hypothetical, for example, the
defendant almost certainly would lodge an objection based on “unfair
prejudice” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (or its state-law
181.
182.
183.
184.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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counterpart), so that the trial court would have to assess the risk of such
prejudice under background principles of evidence law.185 Against this
backdrop, and in light of the Sherbert exception, it seems especially
improper to preclude consideration of constitutional prejudice as part
of the court’s admissibility assessment. After all, when judges are
already considering the prejudicial effects of proffered evidence, it
hardly seems too meddlesome to call on them to take account—just as
the Court did in Sherbert—of the specialized First Amendment
considerations at work in the case. And this conclusion seems all the
more sound in light of the judicial branch’s longstanding role—and
resulting specialized competence—in standing above the political fray
to safeguard free-speech values.
As with O’Brien and Humanitarian Law Project, there may be
reasons to conclude that the principle of Sherbert does not obviously
control prosecutorial attempts to use past-speech evidence. But the
policy-based thematic drift of Sherbert as refined in Smith—that it is
proper to include constitutional considerations in decision-making
processes focused on “particular circumstances”—bears directly on the
set of problems addressed in this Article. The policy of Sherbert
supports the conclusion that courts should engage with—rather than
ignore—Free Speech Clause values as they make “individualized
governmental assessment[s]” in evaluating objections to past-speech
evidence.
D. Past-Speech Evidence and First Amendment Due Process
The preceding discussion reveals that the policies underlying the
Court’s work with generally applicable laws—including its decisions in
O’Brien, Humanitarian Law Project, Sherbert, and even Smith—
support the imposition of meaningful First Amendment limits on
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence. Some analysts, however,
might try to push these cases to one side by claiming that substantive
legal restrictions and procedural rules of evidence necessarily fall into
separate juridical categories. This view of things is dubious from the
start because “thoughtful legal observers have recognized that there is
no bright line between procedure and substance in whatever legal
context one encounters the dichotomy.”186 But even if one embraces
such a distinction with all-out enthusiasm, there is a powerful reason
185. FED. R. EVID. 403.
186. Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1926–27 (2006).
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not to exempt evidence law from Free Speech Clause challenges based
on that law’s generally applicable character. The reason stems from
another set of constitutional limits—focused squarely on procedural,
rather than substantive, law—that rein in the operation of many
generally applicable rules. These limits center on what Professor Henry
P. Monaghan famously calls “First Amendment due process.”187 As the
label suggests, this doctrine draws simultaneously on substancecentered free-speech values and non-substance-centered procedural
due process values.188
Consider New York Times v. Sullivan.189 In that case, the Court
held that speech about public officials cannot support a defamation
action unless the defendant acts with “actual malice.”190 But the Court
did not stop there. It also held that the burden of proof as to actual
malice must rest on public-official plaintiffs and that those plaintiffs
must prove such malice with “convincing clarity.”191 Obviously, state
laws that provide for a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of
proof are generally applicable in nature. After all, that standard applies
routinely in tort actions—indeed, in almost all civil actions of any
kind.192 The Court in Sullivan, however, threw the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard out the window. Relying on the First
187. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV.
518 (1970) (discussing procedural safeguards intended to limit the harm of governmental action
that impedes First Amendment rights).
188. As a result, the doctrine of First Amendment due process may get a lift from an aspect
of Smith that is entirely separate from the Smith Court’s treatment of Sherbert. In particular, the
Court recognized that its approach of insulating generally applicable laws from constitutional
challenges should sometimes give way in cases that involve the “hybrid” operation of two separate
constitutional protections. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. This line of analysis seems fully applicable
here because constitutional limits based on First Amendment due process, by their nature, stem
from a hybrid right rooted in the joint operation of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause and
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To be sure, some scholars
might challenge judicial recognition of hybrid rights on textualist grounds. In particular, they
might claim that such hybridization is inconsistent with the Constitution’s textual structure of
setting forth what seem to be separate, freestanding safeguards of individual rights. In the context
of past-speech evidence, however, this textualist critique has little force. In Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496 (1973), the Court, in applying the Fourth Amendment, declared that “we examine
what is ‘unreasonable’ in the light of the values of freedom of expression.” Id. at 504. It seems no
less appropriate to say courts should likewise look at those same “values of freedom of
expression” in determining what process is “due” as they evaluate the adequacy of governmentspecified procedural rules, including the rules of evidence. See id.
189. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
190. Id. at 279–80.
191. Id. at 285–86.
192. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5122, at 399 (2d ed. 2005).
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Amendment, the Court compelled states to depart from this generally
applicable procedural rule to ensure that free-expression values
receive the level of protection that the Constitution requires.193
One might say that Sullivan sheds little light on the subject of pastspeech evidence because that case concerned only the distinctly
speech-centered subject of defamation law. This reasoning is faulty,
however, because the Court has invoked the Free Speech Clause to
require departures from generally applicable rules of procedure in a
broad array of rulings,194 including many rulings that have nothing to
do with the law of defamation.195 In cases of particular relevance here,
for example, the Court has wielded the tool of First Amendment due
process to require appellate tribunals to review trial court findings de
novo, regardless of the review standard put in place by generally
applicable procedural rules.196 In light of these authorities, it is not
193. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86 (noting that “the constitutional standard demands”
imposition of the “convincing clarity” formulation).
194. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (plurality opinion) (noting that “we
have often held some procedures . . . to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may
penalize protected speech” (citations omitted)); Faulkner, supra note 5, at 13, 21 (noting that First
Amendment due process applies in “numerous areas”); see also Carroll v. President & Comm’rs
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (imposing more exacting rules than otherwise would
apply regarding the issuance of temporary restraining orders when they target parades or similar
free-speech activities); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–60 (1965) (holding that a filmlicensing system avoids “constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system,” including by ensuring expedited judicial
review); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (requiring heightened particularity in
warrants when the materials to be seized are speech related); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (requiring special procedural rules regarding state control of obscenity); Marcus
v. 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 731–33 (1961) (imposing special requirements for warrants
regarding seizures of speech-related materials). In the same vein are rulings that apply First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which alters traditional jurisdictional rules of standing. See
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991)
(discussing various ways the judicial system has dealt with statutes that are overly broad in the
conduct they regulate).
195. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (adopting
burden-of-proof-shifting methodology to deal with mixed-motive speech cases); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (imposing the burden of proof on the Government when
dissident taxpayer-speakers were denied tax exemptions); see also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 299–300 (1961) (requiring judicial assessment of proof of a defendant’s membership in an
organization “strictissimi juris” to ensure that the defendant is not “punished for his adherence to
[that organization’s] lawful and constitutionally protected purposes because of [the
organization’s] other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share”); Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (requiring “clear proof” of the defendant’s specific intent
not just to join a revolutionary organization but also to accomplish its unlawful aims).
196. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (requiring use
of de novo review “in reviewing a determination of actual malice”); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298, 328 (1957) (endorsing “rigorous standards of review” in incitement-related Smith Act
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surprising that other analysts—including Professor Quint—focus their
attention on First Amendment due process principles in urging courts
to place free-expression-based limits on prosecutorial use of pastspeech evidence.197
There is much merit in this approach. But analysts who have relied
on it have failed to note that there is an analytical fly in the ointment.
The problem is that it is one thing to say that courts can override
generally applicable procedural rules, but it is a very different thing to
say that courts must do so—or even that they must think hard about
doing so.198 This point takes on a sharper focus when one recalls that
the principle of First Amendment due process differs in a significant
way from the principles laid down in O’Brien, Humanitarian Law
Project, and Sherbert. If a challenged government action falls within
the reach of those three precedents, after all, it automatically triggers
specialized scrutiny; indeed, if either Humanitarian Law Project or
Sherbert applies with full force, the challenged government action is
subject to the strictest form of constitutional review.
The law of First Amendment due process, however, operates
differently because there are large numbers of generally applicable
procedural rules that apply equally (and noncontroversially) in both
free-speech-related and other cases. Courts, for example, have never
professed to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny—or, indeed, any level
of First Amendment scrutiny at all—to civil pleading requirements,
jury selection procedures, the requisite level of jury consensus,
indictment-specificity rules, or the probable-cause charging
requirement, even when the case centers on speech-related activity.
The key point is that many procedural rules have never been
understood to trigger elevated as-applied Free Speech Clause review.
Put another way, if a First Amendment overlay on generally applicable
rules of evidence were to find its moorings in authorities such as
Sullivan, that overlay would require a special singling out of the law of
evidence because the Court’s past rulings have created only a here-

prosecutions).
197. Quint, supra note 2, at 1641; accord Faulkner, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that “because
First Amendment rights are particularly susceptible to infringement, the Court has been willing
to adopt extraordinary procedural safeguards” in an effort to safeguard those rights).
198. Professor Quint, for example, seems to gloss over this point when he claims, without
qualification, that “procedural guarantees must be applied with special strictness when First
Amendment rights are at stake.” See Quint, supra note 2, at 1641.
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and-there, exceptional-situation, hodge-podge set of First Amendment
due process limits.199
This is not to say that there is no basis for recognizing a First
Amendment due process limit on generally applicable evidence law.
Far from it.200 It is to say, however, that proponents of this approach
must justify Free Speech Clause policing of the generally applicable
rules of evidence with an argument that reaches beyond simply uttering
the mantra of “First Amendment due process.” Is that possible? Many
past rulings of the Court signal that it is. Most notably:
1. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, courts must exempt from
the general application of antitrust statutes collective efforts by
otherwise competing businesses to secure jointly self-serving changes
in the law.201 In Footnote 3 of United Mine Workers v. Pennington,202
the Court noted that this principle would not necessarily preclude the
use of evidence of such collective efforts as part of an effort to prove
the defendant’s engagement in more nefarious forms of collusion, such
as price-fixing.203 But the Court also observed that it would “be within
the province of the trial judge to admit this evidence, if he deemed it
probative and not unduly prejudicial.”204 This passage thus supports the
imposition of a prejudice-based First Amendment limit on use of pastspeech evidence, even if the evidence is deemed relevant.205
2. In Abrams v. United States,206 the Court upheld the convictions
of five defendants under the Espionage Act for disseminating
pamphlets containing “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive” statements

199. Waters, 511 U.S. at 670–71 (plurality opinion) (noting that “not every procedure that may
safeguard protected speech is constitutionally mandated”; that “[w]e have never set forth a
general test to determine when a procedural safeguard is required”; that only “some procedural
requirements” are mandated by the First Amendment; and that “[n]one of us have discovered a
general principle to determine where this line is to be drawn”).
200. Professor Quint, for example, argues that the Sullivan burden-of-proof rule supports “a
stringent rule of exclusion” in past-speech-evidence cases because of the “more compelling”
individual interests at stake in criminal, as opposed to civil, proceedings. Quint, supra note 2, at
1660 & n.132.
201. See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 5, at 29–30 (citations omitted).
202. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
203. Id. at 670 n.3.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. See Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir.
1978) (deeming evidence properly excluded based on “prejudice” concerns under Footnote 3,
given “the defendants’ [F]irst [A]mendment interests”).
206. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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about the nation’s involvement in World War I.207 The case, however,
has since come to stand for the libertarian views expressed in the
“classic” opinion of the great dissenter, Justice Holmes.208 Holmes’s
analysis focused on the idea that the defendants’ words did not rise to
the level of proscribable incitement.209 In a little-noticed sentence
regarding the defendants’ past statements, however, Justice Holmes
also asserted that “no one has a right even to consider [them] in dealing
with the charges before the Court.”210 And a principle under which “no
one has a right even to consider” a defendant’s past protected speech
signals that, at least in some cases, such speech may not be used as
evidence.
3. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee211 arose
out of a legislative committee’s effort to require the presentation of
evidence—namely, an official listing of a local NAACP branch’s
members—in connection with an investigation of ties between that
organization and the Communist Party.212 After an NAACP official
refused to supply this material, he was held in contempt.213 The Court,
however, overturned the imposition of this penalty, stating that “it is
an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which
intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech,
press, association and petition that the State convincingly show a
substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of
overriding and compelling state interest.”214 The Court went on to
declare that “the Committee has not ‘demonstrated so cogent an
interest in obtaining and making public’ the membership information
. . . as to ‘justify the [threatened] substantial abridgment of
associational freedom.’”215 Plainly, judicial proceedings, no less than
legislative proceedings, can “intrude[] into the area of constitutional
rights”—indeed, intrude so greatly that they deprive the defendant of
life or liberty. And so, it is hard to see why similar prosecutorial efforts

207. Id. at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 469 n.51 (1985).
209. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 630.
211. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
212. Id. at 540–42.
213. Id. at 543.
214. Id. at 546.
215. Id. (citation omitted).
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to elicit evidence of public-concern speech should not be subject to the
same sort of speech-sensitive judicial balancing that the Court
endorsed in Gibson.216
4. As Professor Quint details, the Court has invoked First
Amendment due process principles to install specialized constitutional
rules in free-speech cases, not only as to the required quantum of
evidence, as in Sullivan, but also as to the minimum sufficiency of
evidence.217 Although these rulings technically do not concern the
admissibility of evidence, they operate to strip evidence of the
probative effect it otherwise would have.218 As common sense suggests,
rules that deprive evidence of probative significance are little different,
as a practical matter, from rules that exclude evidence from
consideration by the factfinder. Accordingly, the recognition of First
Amendment due process limits in the former context lends support to
the recognition of similar limits in the latter.
5. In Branzburg v. Hayes,219 Justice Powell—in supplying the
decisive fifth vote in support of the majority’s ruling—endorsed a First
Amendment balancing rule designed to override the generally
applicable principle that permits grand juries to require the
presentation of all relevant evidence.220 More specifically, he concluded
216. See Quint, supra note 2, at 1663 n.142 (detailing why, because of what is at stake in each,
“the First Amendment interest is, if anything stronger” when past-speech evidence is offered in
criminal proceedings than in legislative proceedings); see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 933
(emphasizing the particularly “great” speech-burdening effect when challenged evidence “may
be responsible for a conviction”).
217. See, e.g., Quint, supra note 2, at 1654 (discussing the Noto and Scales cases and the
“unusually rigorous” proof requirements they impose for demonstrating constitutionally required
specific-intent requirements); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366 (2003) (rejecting an
evidentiary presumption that drew an inference of intent to intimidate from expressive action
standing alone). Notably, lower courts have built on these precedents in speech-protective ways.
See Quint, supra note 2, at 1656 (discussing the First Circuit’s Spock case as displacing generally
applicable “restrictions on the sufficiency of the evidence to impose special First Amendment
limitations”); id. at 1654–55 (reflecting similarly on the Ninth Circuit’s Hellman decision).
218. In particular, these cases suggest that, absent free-speech concerns, level of evidence A
would be sufficient to convict, but that because the Free Speech Clause is in the picture, a higher
level of evidence—say, A plus B—is required. The practical effect of such a rule is to render
ineffectual any body of evidence less than A plus B. In particular, evidence A standing alone—
even if it is so probative that it would take the case to the jury under ordinary circumstances—is
deemed to have no probative effect at all, entirely because of the force exerted by the First
Amendment.
219. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
220. See Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1951, 1951, 1954 (2006) (arguing that Justice Powell’s endorsement of a balancing test embodies
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that when significant free-speech concerns present themselves—as
when a reporter seeks to avoid disclosing the name of a confidential
source—the judge must “strik[e] . . . a proper balance between freedom
of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony . . . on a case-by-case basis.”221 Again, the analogy to cases
involving prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence is apparent. If the
Government must run the gauntlet of a speech-protective balancing
test when it seeks to compel the presentation of relevant evidence
merely to a grand jury, simple logic suggests that it should have to do
no less when it seeks to compel the presentation of such evidence in
the criminal trial itself.222
6. Finally, the Court’s ruling in Dawson supports the endorsement
of a meaningful judicial role in policing evidentiary use of publicconcern speech. To be sure, the focal point of the Court’s reasoning in
Dawson was that the challenged evidence lacked relevance to the
issues under consideration by the jury. On the better view, however,
the Court required something more than ordinary evidentiary
relevance,223 while also emphasizing the prejudicial nature of the
challenged Aryan Brotherhood proof, which focused on the
defendant’s “morally reprehensible” beliefs.224 In any event, judicial
endorsement of a constitutional rule that ties exclusion of past-speech
evidence solely to a finding of relevance makes little, if any, sense as a
matter of First Amendment policy. It is, after all, the presence of a
prejudicial impact on the exercise of free-speech rights—and not the
problem of evidentiary irrelevance—that gives rise to a First
Amendment problem in past-speech-evidence cases in the first place.225
the holding in Branzburg because he supplied the critical fifth vote).
221. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Nickerson, supra note 6, at
846 (noting that “most appellate circuits have adopted the case-by-case approach” of Justice
Powell).
222. See Quint, supra note 2, at 1664 (noting that “the First Amendment interests favoring
exclusion of a defendant’s protected speech at trial seem substantially stronger than the interests
favoring exclusion of similar material from consideration by the grand jury” because of the
prospect of actual conviction at trial).
223. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 42 (arguing that Dawson required that “evidence must be
really relevant to be admitted over a First Amendment objection” and that “the conclusion of
irrelevance in Dawson was a fiction”); id. at 40 n.233 (describing Dawson as involving “supranormal relevance scrutiny”); Nickerson, supra note 6, at 859 n.76 (same).
224. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 167 (1992); see Faulkner, supra note 5, at 38 (noting
that while Dawson “ostensibly rested on relevance grounds, its holding of ‘constitutional error’
can only be explained in terms of prejudice”).
225. See supra notes 58, 107–09 and accompanying text.
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In addition, a relevance-only approach to admissibility would invite
odd and troubling results. In particular, such an approach might well
foreclose the use of irrelevant past-speech proof that presents only
limited dangers of free-expression-related prejudice, while allowing
the use of only marginally relevant evidence even when it presents the
most far-reaching dangers of free-expression-related prejudice. Simply
put, it is strange—if not anomalous—to reject the weighing of
evidentiary prejudice in this First Amendment context when it is that
very prejudice that alone brings the First Amendment into play.226
At the very least, Dawson swept away a key argument against
recognition of First Amendment limits on past-speech evidence—
namely, the argument that any particular application of the rules of
evidence is rightly exempt from challenge under the Free Speech
Clause because of those rules’ generally applicable nature. This is the
case because the Delaware courts had concluded—with good reason—
that the Aryan Brotherhood proof that the Supreme Court deemed
inadmissible under the Free Speech Clause was relevant under the
generally applicable rules of state evidence law.227 Accordingly, with
Dawson, the horse is out of the barn. There no longer can be doubt
that there exist some First Amendment limits on otherwise operative
general rules of evidence law. Thus, courts must recognize and define
those limits, and they must do so with underlying First Amendment
policies in mind.
E. Potential Counterarguments
The foregoing discussion supports three conclusions. First,
arguments for broadly rejecting constitutional challenges to the
admission of past-speech evidence based on cases such as Haupt,
Dawson, and Mitchell, or based on the general applicability of rules of
evidence, are not sustainable. Second, constitutional precedent and
policy—including with regard to the proper evaluation of generally
applicable laws—support recognition of a meaningful judicial role in
policing the use of past-speech evidence. Third, any such meaningful
assessment must thoughtfully take into account not only the relevance
of proffered past-speech evidence, but also its potential prejudicial
effects.

226. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 9 (finding “reason to suppose that a majority [in Dawson]
would embrace a balancing approach which would flexibly protect First Amendment values”).
227. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Others may well look to find missteps in this line of analysis. They
might claim, in particular, that the argument misuses precedent,
wrongly minimizes vital government interests, invites undue
uncertainty, or ignores key features of free-expression theory. This
Section addresses each of these potential critiques.
1. Precedent. As to precedent, skeptics might argue that the
authority-based arguments set forth above seek to place square pegs in
round holes. On this view, the question presented by prosecutorial use
of past-speech evidence is far removed from the questions dealt with
in O’Brien, Humanitarian Law Project, and Sherbert because those
cases involved substantive legal restrictions, not “just” the use of
speech as part of the Government’s effort to prove the defendant’s
guilt.228 These critics might add that the Court in those cases subjected
challenged laws to traditional forms of means-ends analysis that are not
well suited for use by courts as they go about making contextual
judgments about the admissibility of evidence.229 To say that neither
O’Brien nor Humanitarian Law Project nor Sherbert is directly
controlling in past-speech-evidence cases, however, is to miss the key
point—namely, that the analytical grounding of each of these
precedents suggests that courts must do more than pay mere lip service
to free-speech values in this context. And this takeaway gains still more
strength when one considers these precedents as a collective whole,
together with the Court’s highly libertarian jurisprudence regarding
speech on matters of public concern. In sum, the gravitational pull of
the Court’s existing Free Speech Clause jurisprudence is powerful in
this context, and it suggests that courts must assess in a meaningful way
First Amendment objections to prosecutorial use of past-speech
evidence.
2. Policy. Skeptics might also make arguments of policy. They
could assert, for example, that admitting past-speech evidence at trial
is important because it is probative, often on matters that are otherwise
228. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
229. Complexity rears its head, in part, because judges cannot vindicate First Amendment
values in the context of past-speech evidence in one fell swoop. They cannot, for example, craft
the sort of bright-line solution used in Sherbert, where the Court announced that all sincere
Sabbatarians simply cannot be, on that basis, excluded from receiving workers-compensation
benefits. See supra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert). But that hardly
means that courts cannot deal with First Amendment evidence problems just as they deal with
other objections to concededly relevant evidence—that is, by taking account of both evidentiary
relevance and competing values.
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difficult to prove, such as the defendant’s state of mind. These skeptics
might add that judges, if given the chance, would afford too much
weight to free-speech-related “prejudice,” thus frustrating the state’s
vital interest in securing proper criminal convictions. These points,
however, are overdrawn. Any proper judicial assessment of pastspeech evidence necessarily would involve judicial consideration not
only of potential prejudicial effects, but also of the probative value of
the evidence and of prosecutorial needs, with the consequence that
much, if not most, past-speech evidence would be admitted. Judges are
trusted in other contexts to apply evidence rules in a fair-minded
fashion. There is, accordingly, no sound reason to conclude that these
same judges would suddenly fall into a misplaced mindset that fixates
myopically on the risk of prejudicial effects when asked to apply
constitutional limits to the use of past-speech evidence.
3. Predictability. Critics might advance another objection—
namely, that the contextual weighing of the costs and benefits of pastspeech evidence, under some inevitably fuzzy First Amendment rule,
would unduly complicate evidence law and add a new layer of
complexity to the already-challenging adjudication of criminal cases.
The premise of this argument is shaky. For example, as previously
noted, federal courts already must engage in the trial-complicating
balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice when they apply
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to all sorts of evidence. Enriching this
analysis to take special account of free-speech concerns—and doing so
only in the discrete set of cases involving speech on matters of public
concern—thus does not seem to be a game-changer in terms of
administrative tribulations. There is a deeper point, too. Time and
again, the Court has indicated that when vital constitutional interests
are at stake, concerns about “administrative convenience” must give
way.230 Even more fundamentally, the great mass of constitutional law
supports a basic proposition of overarching salience here—the goal of
protecting core constitutional rights is not to be sacrificed on an altar
built of easy-to-apply rules.231

230. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (noting
that “the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency”); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977) (“[T]he prospect of additional administrative
inconvenience has not been thought to justify invasion of fundamental constitutional rights.”);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (rejecting “administrative ease and convenience as
sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based classifications”).
231. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 606 (1989) (“It is perhaps
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Indeed, in a seminal public-concern-speech case, Connick v.
Myers,232 the Court emphatically endorsed a context-specific—and
frustratingly tough-to-administer—balancing approach. There, the
Court confronted the question whether a terminated public employee
can succeed on a First Amendment claim when the firing allegedly
resulted in part from her engagement in public-concern speech.233 The
Court declared that deciding such a case requires an analysis that
includes “full consideration of the government’s interest,”234 as well as
the precise “nature of the employee’s expression”235 and “the context”
in which the government decided to act.236 Also significant is whether
the speech “touched upon matters of public concern in only a most
limited sense”237 or involved such matters “more substantially.”238 The
Court acknowledged that “such particularized balancing is difficult,”239
but it also insisted that a more wooden approach was unacceptable in
light of “the enormous variety of fact situations” that such cases
present.240 As with public-concern speech in the public-employee
context, so too with public-concern speech that the Government seeks
to use as evidence. In both settings, judges can and “must reach the
most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests”241 after
taking account of “the whole record.”242

unfortunate, but nonetheless inevitable, that the broad language of many clauses within the Bill
of Rights must be translated into adjudicatory principles that realize their full meaning only after
their application to a series of concrete cases.”).
232. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
233. Id. at 141–42.
234. Id. at 150.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 153–54.
237. Id. at 154.
238. Id. at 152.
239. Id. at 150.
240. Id. at 154 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)).
241. Id. at 150.
242. Id. at 148. In a post-Connick ruling that again concerned speech on matters of public
concern, a four-Justice plurality even more pointedly explained that while “lack of [a more
particularized] test is inconvenient, . . . this does not relieve us of our responsibility to decide the
case”; the result is that courts must “answer[] the question on a case-by-case basis.” Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994). Indeed, there are special reasons to say that courts should
carry over a Connick-like balancing approach to past-speech-evidence cases. First, public
employees choose to be public employees—and thus to assume the speech-related limits that
attend that role. Criminal defendants, in contrast, do not choose to be criminal defendants.
Second, in endorsing judicial balancing in cases such as Connick, the Justices have emphasized
the difference between government action as an “employer” (with concomitantly greater
authority to manage speech) and as a “sovereign” (with concomitantly lesser authority to manage
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4. Free-Speech Theory. Finally, those who favor insulating
evidence law from free-speech-based attacks might seek to leverage
the prior work of First Amendment theorists, most notably thenProfessor and now-Justice Elena Kagan. According to Justice Kagan’s
pre-appointment scholarship, free-speech doctrine should center not
so much on guarding against the speech-burdening effects of
government actions as on policing the government’s impermissible
speech-suppressive motives.243 Building on this theme, analysts might
reason that the framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence and kindred
bodies of state law obviously did not act with the motive of targeting
unpopular speakers. It follows, so the argument goes, that the
introduction of past-speech evidence merits no special judicial
attention, regardless of any speech-burdening impact that evidence
might produce in any particular case.
One problem with this analysis is that controversy surrounds the
effort to cast free-speech law as properly centered on addressing
improper government motives. Indeed, many scholars have argued
that real-world effects, as opposed to government purposes, should
take center stage in First Amendment analysis.244 Justice Kagan herself
speech). Id. at 671–74. Without question, when the State marshals evidence in a criminal
prosecution, it is acting not as an employer, but as a sovereign. See Nickerson, supra note 6, at
885–86 (noting the special claim for case-by-case assessments when criminal subpoenas or civil
discovery orders involve the surrender of evidence concerning speech on matters of public
concern). Perhaps most importantly, the Court already has recognized the need to engage in a
“case by case” analysis of the operation of generally applicable evidence rules to ensure the
proper operation of constitutional fundamental rights. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 141, § 11.3
(noting that the Supreme Court has taken an “ad hoc” and “case-specific” approach to
determining, pursuant to a “balancing test” with an “as-applied nature,” whether generally
applicable rules of evidence law must give way because of the constitutional right of
confrontation); Nagareda, supra note 141, at 1067–81 (describing the Court’s approach in this
area as requiring “case-by-case,” “ad hoc,” and “as applied” assessments). For illustrative cases,
see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (holding that because of the right of defendants to
testify on their own behalf, the generally applicable state bans on hypnotically refreshed
testimony must give way, so long as particular “circumstances present an argument of
admissibility”), Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (refusing to apply hearsay law
“mechanistically,” and instead requiring attentiveness to “the circumstances of the particular
case”), and Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (stating that “no fixed rule” controls
the constitutional inquiry and calling instead for “balancing” based on “the particular
circumstances of each case”).
243. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 414 (asserting that free-speech law’s “primary, though
unstated, object” is “the discovery of improper governmental motives”); see also Srikanth
Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based
Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401, 418 (1995).
244. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1996) (advocating an effects-based approach under which “laws having the incidental
effect of substantially burdening fundamental rights to engage in primary conduct should be
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acknowledged that effects-based analysis has driven some significant
features of free-speech doctrine.245 And most important of all, the
Court itself has pointedly declared that the “abridgement of [freeexpression] rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from
varied forms of government actions.”246
In any event, even under a purpose-centered view of the Free
Speech Clause, there is an overwhelming difficulty with opposing a rule
of contextual judicial assessments of past-speech evidence. The
difficulty arises because—as even Justice Kagan notes— impermissible
speech-punishing motives oftentimes lie not in the enactment of laws,
but in their application.247 And courts properly have devised many
“prophylactic” constitutional rules to ensure that impermissible
government purposes do not lead to the harming of protected
speakers.248 Adopting such a protective rule in the past-speechevidence context seems especially justifiable because, as previously
shown, the risk is acute that juries confronted with this evidence will
latch onto it precisely (and improperly) because the defendant’s
statements veer away from conventional norms.249 No less important,
if courts are to deal with this danger, they have no choice but to do so
by employing a prophylactic, pre-admission policing mechanism. Why?
Because even if juror motives were otherwise readily subject to
discovery—which they are not—post-trial challenges to verdicts are
precluded by settled rules that broadly prohibit the second-guessing of
juror thought processes and discussions.250 In sum, a purpose-centered
subject to heightened scrutiny”); see also Kagan, supra note 72, at 413 (acknowledging that “most
descriptive . . . as well as most normative discussions of [First Amendment] doctrine . . . focus[]
on the effects of a given regulation”).
245. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 427.
246. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (emphasis added); see
also Waters, 511 U.S. at 670 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[T]he First Amendment creates
a strong presumption against punishing protected speech even inadvertently . . . .”); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (“[O]ur cases
have consistently held that ‘[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the
First Amendment.’” (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 592 (1983))).
247. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 457, 459, 462–63.
248. Id. at 457.
249. See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text.
250. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1). Leading cases barring such inquiries include Tanner v.
United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115–16 (1987) (precluding efforts to secure evidence that jury
members consumed large quantities of alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, or some combination thereof
to the point that service on the jury was “one big party”) and Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521,
525–26 (2014) (blocking testimony about jury deliberations even when offered to show that a
panel member lied during voir dire, in part because this result comported with the majority of
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conception of free-speech theory supports, rather than undermines, a
constitutional requirement that trial judges engage in meaningful preadmission assessments when prosecutors offer past-speech evidence.
A foundational aspect of free-speech policy confirms the
correctness of this approach. At the heart of First Amendment law lies
the idea that speakers should not suffer government-imposed burdens
because of the viewpoints they express.251 Yet the risk of penalizing
speakers on this prohibited basis is at a high ebb in past-speechevidence cases because, as illustrated by the hypothetical bomber case,
the defendant may end up being convicted precisely because of the
repugnance of the viewpoint the defendant has espoused.252 In short,
to the extent that First Amendment law embodies special concerns
about viewpoint discrimination—which it most emphatically does253—
that law also should reflect a serious concern about the use of
viewpoint-expressive speech offered by prosecutors at trial.
*

*

*

The bottom line is that First Amendment precedent and policy
suggest that courts must take a contextual approach to proposed
prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence, with the goal of carefully
assessing the competing concerns presented by the facts of the
particular case. As courts implement this idea, they will have to lay
down more particularized rules that give meaningful protection to First
Amendment values. The remainder of this Article considers what
those rules should be.
IV. RULES FOR EVALUATING THE USE OF PAST-SPEECH EVIDENCE
What rules should courts recognize to ensure that free-speech
rights are adequately protected in past-speech evidence cases? This
common law rulings); see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 864–65 (2017)
(summarizing rules that provide “jurors with considerable assurance that after being discharged
they will not be summoned to recount their deliberations . . . or annoyed by litigants seeking to
challenge the verdict”).
251. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(describing viewpoint discrimination as “an egregious form of content discrimination”); accord,
e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (noting that “restrictions [of
speech rights] based on viewpoint are prohibited”).
252. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Holmes’s opinion in
Abrams).
253. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762 (2017) (Alito, J., for four members of the
Court); id. at 1765, 1768 (Kennedy, J., for four other members of the Court).
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Part suggests three separate rules that merit recognition: one
concerning trial procedure, one concerning appellate procedure, and
one concerning the substantive legal standard for testing admissibility.
As to trial procedure, the key reform would mandate consideration of
First Amendment objections to past-speech evidence in specialized
hearings conducted outside the presence of the jury. As to appellate
procedure, the courts should put in place a new standard of review—
far more exacting than the traditional “abuse of discretion” standard—
for assessing claims of trial court error in past-speech evidentiary
rulings. Finally, as to the proper litmus test of admissibility, courts
should take care to inquire whether the probative value of the
objected-to evidence outweighs all the Free Speech Clause burdens its
introduction would entail, including not only burdens of unfair
prejudice, but also burdens of “fair prejudice” and chilling effects.
A. Trial Procedure
The Court has long insisted that trial judges use specialized
procedural rules as they assess the admissibility of evidence that is
potentially subject to exclusion pursuant to constitutional commands.
In Jackson v. Denno,254 for example, the Court laid down specialized
process requirements for dealing with objections to the evidentiary use
of confessions, including a requirement that the trial court conduct “an
adequate evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results.”255
Taking much the same approach, the Court should insist that trial
judges deploy two mechanisms of procedural care when they confront
objections to past-speech evidence. First, trial judges should process
these objections in carefully conducted proceedings that occur outside
the presence of the jury.256 As with confessions, the hot-button
character of protected-speech evidence suggests that juries should be
shielded from any whiff of it unless and until the court deems it
admissible.257 In addition, the risk exists that as lawyers discuss the
admissibility of such evidence, the impact of that evidence on the minds
of jurors is heightened—perhaps heightened greatly—even if the trial
judge in the end decides to exclude it. In short, holding hearings away

254. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
255. Id. at 394.
256. Accord Faulkner, supra note 5, at 21 (endorsing this approach); Quint, supra note 2, at
1666 (same).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951); United States v. Inman, 352
F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965).
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from the jury would help reduce both factfinder confusion and
prejudicial impact. This requirement also would steer the judicial mind
in the direction of assessing past-speech evidence with the heightened
measure of care it rightly deserves.
Second, trial judges should have to set forth on the record their
reasons for deciding to admit or exclude the challenged evidence.258
The advantages created by taking this approach are apparent.
Requiring a reasoned opinion would foster analytical discipline and
discourage laxity in the decision-making process. It would remind trial
judges that “indispensable”259 and “preferred”260 speech-related
freedoms are at stake in the case, while also helping to facilitate wellinformed appellate review. Finally, mandating reason-giving would
simply slow things down. And slowing down the making of trial court
rulings on Free Speech Clause objections might well serve to
counteract the tendency of judges to assume too readily—in much the
same way as juries might do—that past-speech evidence should bear
on the outcome of a trial simply because it has some form of relevance.
B. Appellate Review
No less than trial judges, appellate tribunals should adhere to
special procedures in dealing with questions that concern past-speech
evidence. In particular, appellate courts should abandon the highly
deferential mode of review applicable to trial court rulings made under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.261 As explained above, the Court
already has put in place rules that mandate de novo appellate review
of trial court actions that endanger free-speech values,262 and the Court
has taken the same approach in other constitutional contexts as well.263
Of particular importance here, the Court has endorsed de novo review

258. Accord Dennis, supra note 4, at 34 (endorsing this approach); Faulkner, supra note 5, at
21 (same); Quint, supra note 2, at 1666 (same).
259. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
260. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
261. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d
460, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (indicating that, under Rule 403 review, “appellate courts must be
‘extremely wary’ of second-guessing” trial court rulings (quoting Henderson v. George Wash.
Univ., 449 F.3d 127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
262. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
263. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136 (1999) (plurality opinion) (declaring, in applying
the Confrontation Clause, that “as with other fact-intensive, mixed questions of constitutional
law . . . ‘[i]ndependent review is necessary’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697
(1996))).
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in public-concern-speech settings.264 Against this backdrop, it is not
surprising that some scholars argue for de novo review of trial court
decisions that authorize prosecutorial use of past-speech evidence in
the face of First Amendment objections.265
All things considered, another approach might prove to be even
better. Under it, appellate courts would not engage in full-scale de
novo review, but they still would steer clear, by a wide margin, of
employing the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard. This style of
review might be captured in terms such as “extremely confined” or
“short-leash” deference. Such an approach would give trial courts
some wiggle room to authorize prosecutorial use of past-speech
evidence, free from all-out de novo second-guessing.266 And in doing
so, short-leash deference might generate positive results for two
reasons. First, it would reduce the risk of overdeterring the admission
of proper past-speech evidence, particularly as trial judges anticipate
the risk of reversal under specialized double-jeopardy rules that permit
postverdict appeals only by defendants, and not by government
prosecutors.
Second, a rule of short-leash deference would take account of the
practical challenges presented by requiring trial courts to engage in
fact-specific balancing in past-speech-evidence cases. One difficulty
baked into such a contextual balancing approach is that it inevitably
will generate different assessments by different judges, including
different assessments in the same case by trial courts and appellate
tribunals. As a result, a regime of de novo review would inevitably
produce full-blown retrials even in extremely close cases. Some
analysts may see this outcome as salutary. In their view, the
Constitution speaks with one voice to all courts, and the essential
purpose of appellate review is to correct legal errors, especially in
constitutional cases. On another view, however, the central goal of
extending meaningful constitutional controls to past-speech-evidence

264. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1968).
265. Faulkner, supra note 5, at 21; Quint, supra note 2, at 1667; see also Anderson, supra note
5, at 936, 940.
266. One can imagine a case, for example, in which the trial judge, because he is personally
on the scene in pretrial proceedings, perceived a lessened risk of unfair prejudice in the use of the
past-speech evidence than might otherwise exist because of the particular, case-specific unfolding
of questions and answers in the jury-selection process. A rule of strict de novo review would
preclude any consideration of such a factor; a rule of short leash deference, in contrast, would
give such a factor some—but not determinative—significance.
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cases is more systemic in nature. Seen from this vantage point, the key
aim of devising limits in this field is to ensure that trial judges work
with care to protect the free-expression values that prosecutorial
proffers of past-speech evidence tend to threaten. Perhaps a nodeference-at-all approach would work better than a short-leash
deference rule to advance the cause of trial court attentiveness. But
common sense suggests that such a minor difference in appellate
techniques would not make much of a practical difference on this score.
On the other hand, a short-leash-deference approach—by giving a
modest benefit of the doubt to assessments made by trial judges—
would avoid the need for full-scale retrials in close-to-coin-flip cases,
while taking account of whatever advantages trial judges have from
being on the scene when the evidence is offered in real time for
consideration by the jury.
Finally, a rule of short-leash deference, precisely because it is short
leashed, is unlikely to undercut the key aim of developing meaningful
limits on the admission of relevant past-speech evidence. After all, the
use of probing, rather than deeply deferential, scrutiny will allow
appellate courts to develop over time a coherent body of doctrine that
marks the boundaries of permissible trial court action. No less
important, this form of highly probing (even if not de novo) review will
amply empower appellate tribunals to police the oversights and
missteps of any single trial judge in the handling of particular proffers
of past-speech evidence.
C. The Test of Admissibility
The final question concerning the judicial fashioning of pastspeech-evidence doctrine is the most central of all: When a court
encounters a First Amendment challenge to the use of such evidence,
what governing standard should it apply in ruling on its admissibility?
Many answers to this question are possible. Courts could, for example,
apply a rule of automatic exclusion once they decide that publicconcern speech is at issue.267 Such an approach, however, would run
headlong into the Court’s ruling in Haupt, as well as the Court’s
pronouncements in Dawson and Mitchell.268

267. See, e.g., Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 123, at 894–95 (suggesting that
protected past-speech evidence should automatically be excluded in conspiracy prosecutions).
268. Such an inflexible approach also would not fit together well with the contextual balancing
framework set forth and defended in the public-concern-speech cases typified by Connick. See
supra notes 232–42 and accompanying text.
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Another possibility would be to embrace a rule of near-automatic
exclusion—for example, a rule that permits trial courts to admit pastspeech evidence only in “extraordinary circumstances.”269 Rules of this
kind have a place in constitutional law.270 Indeed, the discourse of strict
scrutiny—put to work in both Humanitarian Law Project and
Sherbert—offers support for applying such an approach here.
Adopting a rule of near-automatic exclusion, however, would raise a
variety of problems. To begin with, neither the direct-in-effect-burden
line of decisions typified by Humanitarian Law Project nor the
compulsory-exemption rule of Sherbert fits perfectly together with
past-speech-evidence cases.271 In addition, such an approach would
raise tensions with both the Court’s endorsement of the use of pastspeech evidence in Haupt and its rejection of a comparable expressionprotective standard for public-concern-speech cases in Connick.272
Most important, such a methodology would tip the balance heavily
against the use of past-speech evidence—sometimes, highly relevant
past-speech evidence—notwithstanding strong policies that support
not only acquittal of the innocent but also conviction of the guilty.273
In sum, rules of automatic or near-automatic exclusion would
unduly favor defendants and disfavor government prosecutors. As a
result, courts might take exactly the opposite approach by holding that
relevant past-speech evidence is never subject to First Amendment
objections or that it is excludable in only “rare” or “extraordinary”
instances. These approaches, however, would not take fair account of
First Amendment freedoms rightly recognized by the Court as both
“precious” and “vulnerable”274—just as surely as rules of automatic or
269. Courts could define “extraordinary circumstances” to reference either the distinctly high
probative value of the evidence, the distinctly high importance of ensuring conviction of the guilty,
or both. Consider, for example, the hypothetical bombing case put forward in the Introduction.
Consider also a recorded statement made the day before the bombing in which the defendant
declared, “This government is so terrible I could blow up a building.” Such a near-in-time,
focused, and incontrovertible statement, even if addressing a matter of public concern, might well
be admissible under such an “extraordinary circumstances” test.
270. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (recognizing a
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” in facial-discrimination dormant Commerce Clause cases).
271. See supra notes 161–72 and accompanying text (discussing Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)); supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)) .
272. See supra notes 24–35 (discussing Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (1947)); supra
notes 232–42 and accompanying text (discussing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)).
273. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–09 (1974) (emphasizing the “twofold” purpose
of the criminal justice system, including that “guilt shall not escape” (citation omitted)).
274. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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near-automatic exclusion would not take fair account of countervailing
societal interests. Among other things, these pro-prosecution
standards would, as seen above, create discordance with modern
precedents that pointedly call for “broad protection” of speech on
matters of public concern.275 Indeed, a rare-cases-only approach would
not only fail to provide such speech with “broad protection”; it would
render First Amendment scrutiny in this context little more than an
empty shell.
One might challenge this position by asserting that there is a
special justification for endorsing a no-objections-ever or an
extraordinary-cases-only prosecutor-friendly approach. The argument
is that trial judges can deal with the problems presented by past-speech
proof by delivering thoughtful limiting instructions, thereby reducing
the danger of the jury’s improper use of the problematic evidence. As
discussed above, however, there are built-in difficulties with this
approach due to the limited effectiveness of such instructions.276 In
addition, there is a special problem with relying on cautionary
instructions to deal with past-speech evidence because those
instructions, by their very nature, cannot ameliorate burdens on
expression that stem from either “fair prejudice” or chilling effects.
The whole point of such instructions, after all, is to invite juries to
consider past-speech evidence, while avoiding only the unfairly
prejudicial use of such evidence in the process of deliberating in the
particular case.
Given the difficulties raised by moving to either polar position—
that is, by embracing, on the one hand, an overwhelmingly progovernment or, on the other hand, an overwhelmingly pro-defendant
approach to admissibility—some analysts have tried to steer a middle
course. One synthesis would require judges to focus on the type of pastspeech evidence offered by the prosecution. Courts, for example, might
declare that past speech that embodies art, such as rap music, enjoys
categorical, or nearly categorical, protection from prosecutorial use as
evidence.277 Because such an approach would give more favorable

275. See supra notes 73–91 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Michael Gregory, Murder Was the Case That They Gave Me: Defendant’s Rap
Lyrics As Evidence in a Criminal Trial, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 329, 356 (2016) (arguing that rap
lyrics should not be admissible unless the lyrics virtually “parallel the crime alleged”); Powell,
supra note 122, at 523 (noting that one “solution would be to [exclude] defendants’ rap
lyrics . . . unless they make some specific reference to a crime that only a guilty party would know
about”); id. at 524–25 (advocating “a per se ban on rap lyrics in criminal proceedings” because of
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treatment to some speech than other speech based on content,
however, it would be hard to square with the Court’s often-expressed
aversion to content-based categorizations in the regulation of
protected expression.278
Perhaps in an effort to dodge this problem, Professor Quint floats
the idea that speech-related evidence might be grouped into three
categories, based not so much on the content of expression as on its
form. According to this approach, past-speech evidence would be
subject to a tripartite division, ranging from least protected to most
protected, depending on whether it involves (1) activity in the form of
actual statements by the defendant (for example, a profession like “I
endorse Nazism.”); (2) activity in the form of expressive association by
the defendant (for example, membership in the Nazi Party); and (3)
activity in the form of taking in others’ expressive work (for example,
attendance of a Nazi-sponsored rally or reading Mein Kampf).279 This
way of thinking about past-speech evidence has some value, and courts
should pay it heed as they engage in balancing in this set of cases. In
the end, however, even Professor Quint does not advocate adoption of
three distinct legal tests for each of these forms of speech-related
activity. And wisely so. As Justice Kagan once observed, modern First
Amendment law has spawned “technical, complex classificatory
schemes” under which “categories have multiplied” and “distinctions
grown increasingly fine.”280 To a large extent, this building out of freespeech doctrine reflects the inevitably rich complexities of life. With
regard to past-speech evidence, however, there is little reason to
conclude that endorsing a three-category analytical approach would be
worth the candle. Even without creating rigid and confining analytical

“the potential chilling effect on the genre, accompanied by the fact that lyrics will not make or
break the prosecution’s case”); see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 902, 942–43 (proposing a more
restrictive framework for the admission of evidence, under which “[t]he showing of relevancy
should be more rigorous,” for cases involving proof relating to the defendant’s taste in music or
other entertainment).
278. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (noting that content-based laws
are “presumptively unconstitutional”).
279. Quint, supra note 2, at 1668–76. Some judges have moved, if haltingly, in this direction.
See, e.g., Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by United States
v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Curtin, 489 F.3d at 963 (Kleinfeld, C.J.,
concurring) (distinguishing the case at hand from Haupt because Haupt involved “what a
defendant said . . . not what he merely read”); Anderson, supra note 5, at 937 (arguing for closer
judicial scrutiny of speech “consumption” evidence because mere “[c]uriosity may drive us to try
different materials”).
280. Kagan, supra note 72, at 515.
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categories, after all, courts can take account of these form-of-speech
considerations.
Another middle-course approach for past-speech-evidence cases
would constitutionalize the Rule 403 standard, which balances
probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice in federal
proceedings. In other words, this nonconstitutional rule set forth in the
Federal Rules of Evidence would morph into a constitutional rule
applicable in all federal and state prosecutions as a matter of
entrenched First Amendment doctrine.281 One problem with this
proposal is that Rule 403 was neither formulated to deal specifically
with past-speech evidence nor constructed in an effort to restate Free
Speech Clause limits.282 Even more important, this magical
transformation of Rule 403 would put in place a First Amendment limit
that is too lax. In particular, Rule 403 specifies that unfair prejudice
must “substantially outweigh” probative value for exclusion to occur,
and courts have emphasized this admission-friendly phrasing in
overruling objections to speech-related proof.283 Thus, in the real
world, few Rule 403 motions to exclude relevant evidence are
granted.284 Indeed, the obstacles faced by defendants who assert Rule
403 objections are far-reaching, in part because the burden of justifying
exclusion rests squarely on the objecting party,285 because that burden
is a heavy one,286 and because discharging it requires an all-out focus

281. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (relying on the “firm[]” application of FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b) and 26(c) to protect First Amendment interests implicated by civil discovery of
newsroom thought processes in defamation cases).
282. Prejudice-related questions, for example, could arise under Rule 403 if the prosecution’s
proof touched upon a defendant’s past liaisons with prostitutes. Such evidence, however, has
nothing to do with past speech, speech-related prejudice concerns, or speech-related chilling
effects.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The language of
this rule tilts . . . toward the admission of evidence in close cases.”).
284. As one commentator put the point, “Many Prayers Are Heard, Few Are Answered.”
Michael H. Graham, Relevance, Fed. R. Evid. 401, and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence, Fed.
R. Evid. 403: “Many Prayers Are Heard, Few Are Answered,” 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1080, 1080
(Nov.–Dec. 2009).
285. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that Rule 403
“creates a presumption of admissibility” (citation omitted)); Leah Tabbert, Note, Maximizing the
Min-Max Test: A Proposal to Unify the Framework for Rule 403 Decisions, 100 MINN. L. REV.
2217, 2224 (2016) (same).
286. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:12
(4th ed. 2013) (“[T]he power to exclude evidence under Rule 403 should be sparingly exercised.
The tenor of the language of Rule 403 supports this conclusion, since it contemplates admitting
rather than excluding evidence when probative worth seems equally balanced against dangers like
prejudice and confusion of the issues.” (citation omitted)); David Crump, On the Uses of
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only on problems of unfair prejudice.287 For these reasons, the Rule 403
standard is likely to prove so feckless in practice that it would not
functionally differ from an extraordinary-cases-only rule of
inadmissibility.288 In sum, any properly operationalized First
Amendment standard of exclusion needs to have a much stronger
backbone than that of Rule 403.
Professor Quint attempts to work through these challenges by
proposing a constitutional rule that would “reverse[] the ordinary test”
of admissibility embodied in Rule 403.289 In other words, judges would
have to exclude past-speech evidence “unless the government can
establish that the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighs its prejudicial dangers.”290 There is something to be said for
Professor Quint’s proposed methodology; at the least, it would afford
past speech a meaningful measure of judicial protection.291 But this
approach suffers from problems of its own. To begin with, the starting
point for Professor Quint’s reverse-403 presumption lies in the text of
Rule 403, and there is—as noted earlier—no apparent reason why a
constitutional limit should find its origins in this nonconstitutional rule
of evidence law. Another difficulty with this reverse-403 presumption
is that it seems to rest on too circumscribed a view of “prejudice”
because Rule 403 focuses on a factfinder’s use of the evidence for
impermissible purposes—to infer guilt, for example, because
defendants are bad people, troublemakers, oddballs, or irritants.292 As
Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (“Rule 403 . . . is biased in favor of
admissibility.”); Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking”, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 880 (2002) (“The word ‘substantially’ tilts the balance of Rule 403 toward
admissibility.”).
287. See infra notes 292–96.
288. See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 5, at 6 (deeming Rule 403 review “constitutionally
insufficient,” in part, because “it weights the balancing process towards . . . admission”); id. at 24
(adding that even reforming Rule 403’s test to equalize the roles of probative value and prejudicial
effect would “not provide sufficient protection to First Amendment rights”).
289. Quint, supra note 2, at 1662.
290. Id. (emphasis omitted).
291. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5195, at 313 (2009 Supp.) (characterizing as “persuasively argued” Quint’s
position that “the First Amendment imposes restrictions on the use of political speech and
associations in criminal prosecutions”).
292. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note (indicating that “prejudice” is “[u]nfair”
if it has “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis”); Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (defining “unfair prejudice” as concerning dangers that the
factfinder might be “lure[d] . . . into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to
the offense charged”). But see Imwinkelried, supra note 123, at 888–93 (suggesting that judges
may consider extrinsic social policies in making Rule 403 admissibility determinations).
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previously demonstrated, however, the use of past-speech evidence
burdens First Amendment rights for reasons that reach well beyond
this single form of prejudicial effect.293 The underlying problem is that
the reverse-403-presumption test sharply differentiates between “fair”
and “unfair” uses of evidence in that Rule 403, by its terms, focuses
only on the risk of “unfair prejudice.”294 Even “fair” prejudice,
however, gives rise to a burden that should weigh in the balance when
speech on matters of public concern is at issue.295 So, too, should
systemic concerns about chilling effects.296
Ultimately, composing the precise wording of a legal formula for
gauging the admissibility of relevant past-speech evidence is less
important than embracing the basic principle that the First
Amendment requires courts to evaluate the evidentiary use of such
speech in a meaningful way. In the picture, too, is the fact that the
interests of the government and of the defendant will inevitably clash
in these cases in a wide-ranging and unpredictable variety of ways.
With these points in mind, perhaps the best course is to avoid stating
any operative limit in the technical jargon of the law—such as by laying
down a formula that speaks about a “presumption”297 or (worse yet)
the “reverse” of a preexisting presumption298 or that otherwise makes
use of the lawyerly phraseology of Rule 403. Courts also would do well
to eschew metaphorical flourishes that allude, for example, to “placing
a thumb on the prejudice and confusion side of the scale.”299 Instead,
the best approach—because it is the most comprehensive and direct—
would articulate the controlling proposition in unadorned terminology.
Such a formulation might read something like this:
When an objection is made to proffered evidence that involves speech
on a matter of public concern, the court must balance with care the
relevance of the evidence against the threatened burden on First
Amendment rights. In doing so, the court must take full account of
the constitutional centrality of those rights and recognize that the

293. See supra Part II.B–C.
294. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 341 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing this
point), vacated by Hammoud v. United States, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).
295. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
296. See supra Part II.C.
297. Faulkner, supra note 5, at 6, 21 (deeming past-speech evidence “presumptively
prejudicial”); accord Donohue, supra note 110, at 233.
298. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
299. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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threatened burden on them reaches beyond the risk of unfair
prejudice to the objecting party in the factfinding process.300

Other formulations along these lines can be, and no doubt will be,
framed by judges and commentators.301 It bears emphasis, however,
that the development of the law in this area will depend most of all on
the contextual adjudication of concrete disputes on a case-by-case
basis, regardless of any legal “test” that courts lay down to guide the
balancing process. As courts navigate this process, they must attend not
only to the immediate pressures to admit relevant evidence, but also to
the enduring and systemic concerns underlying the First Amendment.
D. Applications
Limitations of time and space preclude a detailed treatment in this
Article of how these principles might operate in practice. As it turns
out, however, much good work along these lines already exists.
Professor Andrea L. Dennis, for example, has thoughtfully grappled
with the special problems presented by rap-music evidence.302 Robert
P. Faulkner has focused, in a similar fashion, on the intersection of
Noerr-Pennington principles and evidence law.303 Professor Quint’s
pathbreaking article has directed attention to past-speech evidence in
the form of high-octane political dissent.304 Courts should take care to
consider these helpful treatments as they work their way through pastspeech-evidence cases.
Courts also should pay attention to accepted paradigms and wellreasoned precedents. In United States v. Ring,305 for example, the
Government offered—and the court admitted—evidence of the

300. For a similar suggestion, see Nickerson, supra note 6, at 877 (requiring “a showing more
demanding than mere relevance” to gain court-ordered disclosure of speech-related evidence);
see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2011) (advocating a case-specific “pragmatic
balancing” approach for assessing the constitutionality of government reliance on protected
speech activities to initiate criminal investigations; and collecting supportive authority for this
position).
301. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 4, at 30–31 (embracing a “balanced approach” under which
courts would focus on the “unfairly prejudicial nature” of rap lyrics); id. at 33 (adding that
“[j]udges should approach the admissibility determination from” the “vantage point . . . of the
lyricist”).
302. See generally id. (discussing this issue at length).
303. See Faulkner, supra note 5, at 29–35.
304. See generally Quint, supra note 2 (examining the introduction of evidence of membership
in the Communist Party by the Government in the Rosenberg trial).
305. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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defendant’s past-speech activity in the form of campaign
contributions.306 This evidence was offered to show that he used such
contributions not as bribes, but as a stepping stone to secure access to
officeholders whom he later would try to bribe.307 This ruling is
defensible, but only because the evidence concerned contributions
made to candidates of a mainstream party. If the proof showed, for
example, that the defendant had channeled funds to Nazi Party
candidates, so as to gain access to their officeholder friends, a very
different case would be presented, even though the relevance of the
past-expression evidence in each case might seem to be the same. In
terms of the risk of prejudice, after all, it is one thing to support the
campaigns of Republicans and Democrats. It is quite another thing to
send money to Nazis.
Courts also should take care to consider dividing up proffered
past-speech evidence into separate component parts. It might well be,
for example, that a trial judge can and should admit evidence of a
defendant’s gang membership, together with proof of the gang’s
commitment to cross-gang killings, to establish the motive for an
alleged murder.308 But the same judge might simultaneously exclude
proffered evidence of the defendant’s writing of gang-related rap lyrics
that both embody artistic social commentary and tend to show the
defendant’s motive only in a tenuous way. Past-speech evidence is
oftentimes divisible in this way. Trial judges should be attentive to that
fact, looking for chances to break apart clusters of past-speech
evidence, admitting portions of it that are highly relevant, but
excluding portions that have only marginally probative value.
Revisiting the first paragraph of this Article brings into focus a
recurring problem raised by past-speech evidence—that is, the
problem of how to evaluate such evidence when it is offered to prove
a defendant’s state of mind. At the trial of Julius Rosenberg, for
example, prosecutors presented evidence that the defendant had
expressed a preference for the Communist system of government.
Their purpose in offering this evidence was to help prove that the
defendant had in fact passed secret information to the Soviets by

306. Id. at 472–74.
307. Id.
308. Notably, the court might reason either that membership in a murderous gang is not a
matter of public concern or, alternatively, that the relevance of such evidence outweighs the risk
of prejudice it poses.
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showing the jury that he had a motive for doing so.309 Proof of a
preference for one form of government over another, however, links
up only in the loosest way with committing acts of espionage,310 and the
acute risk of unfair prejudice in such a case—which occurred at the
height of the Red Scare—is not hard to see.311
In telling contrast, the Court in Haupt dealt with past-speech
evidence offered for a very different purpose. There, the prosecution
did not tender the defendant’s prior statements merely to prove an
underlying motive, so as to suggest circumstantially that the defendant
engaged in the actus reus of the offense. Instead, the prosecution
offered the proof to establish (probably in the only way possible) a
mens rea element fixed by the statutory prohibition itself—namely,
that the defendant acted with a specific intent to aid the enemy.312 Put
another way, Julius Rosenberg’s past speech was used to prove through
inference that certain conduct had occurred, while Haupt’s past speech
was used to prove directly his state of mind, a statutory element. In
addition, the evidence in Haupt involved much more than an expressed
preference for one form of government over another; indeed, the
father’s declaration that he would kill his son if he fought against
Germany signaled an intense and focused enmity that reached far
beyond simply endorsing an unpopular point of view.313 For these
reasons, the Court’s ruling in Haupt is reconcilable with the mode of
analysis put forward in this Article. On the other hand, there is good
reason to conclude that the Second Circuit’s ruling in Rosenberg did
not take fair account of the free-speech values at stake in the case.314

309. Quint, supra note 2, at 1634–36.
310. Id. at 1669.
311. Id. at 1639 (noting the “grave dangers of prejudice” that arose because the Rosenbergs’
trial came “in the heart of the Cold War period”).
312. See generally supra notes 24–29. The charged crime of treason included a specific-intent
element with regard to aiding the enemy. See supra note 27. Particularly in a treason case such as
Haupt—where another plausible motive (here, parental love) is clearly in the picture—it typically
will be very difficult to prove the defendant’s entirely inner mental state without any resort to
past expressions of the defendant’s thinking.
313. See supra note 29. Most of us, for example, want very much for skilled players on our
sports teams not to shift allegiances to a despised rival. But few of us would find reason to declare
that we would kill those players in the event that they choose to do so.
314. One set of cases that highlights the distinction between background-motive and intentelement inquiries involves antidiscrimination laws. In these cases, plaintiffs and prosecutors seek
to use past-speech evidence to prove a prohibited discriminatory mental state as part of a criminal
or civil proceeding. The laws that give rise to such cases require proof of some adverse action—
for example, a failure to hire, a firing, a battery, or a killing—taken by the defendant with the
specific intent to act because of the victim’s race, gender, or other legally specified personal
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Even precedents that do not involve evidentiary issues might
prove useful to courts as they undertake context-sensitive balancing in
past-speech-evidence cases. In Connick, for example, the Court rightly
emphasized that judges should distinguish between speech that lies at
the heart of the First Amendment and speech that travels near the
outer edges of the public-concern concept.315 Other considerations—
such as the recency of the speech,316 its isolated character,317 its
distinctive potential for creating prejudicial effects,318 its packaging in
forms that are “frequently exaggerated or polemical,”319 and its
immediate or more attenuated relevance to contested factual

characteristic. See generally United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 508 (5th Cir. 2014) (collecting
illustrative attempted uses of past-speech evidence in antidiscrimination cases). Many of these
cases involve the evidentiary use of racist or sexist speech that has occurred during the actual
course of a discrete prohibited action—as when, for example, a defendant screams racial slurs
while engaging in a violent assault. Not surprisingly, such evidence is routinely admitted because
it involves, in the most focused way, the defendant’s own indication of the requisite wrongful
intent as to the very act in question. In other cases, forms of past-speech proof that are less directly
connected to the act in question—such as the defendant’s past expression of racist views—may
be allowed into evidence if they, too, are relevant to show a wrongful animus that is an element
of the legal prohibition. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (observing
that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an employment
decision challenged under an antidiscrimination law). In essence, that is what happened in Haupt,
although the statute at issue in that case was not an antidiscrimination law. As Professor Quint
explains, use of past-speech evidence to prove a statutorily required wrongful intent is typically
far less problematic than the use of such speech, as in the Rosenberg case, to show an underlying
motive for the purpose of proving that the defendant engaged in actions he denies having taken.
Why? Because “fewer inferential steps are necessary” to prove an illicit “intent” directly from the
defendant’s speech. On the other hand, indirectly proving the defendant’s commission of an act
by using speech to establish an underlying motive involves nothing more than an effort to offer
only one piece of (often highly tenuous) circumstantial evidence to establish the actus reus of the
offense. Quint, supra note 2, at 1670–71. Moreover, as suggested in the discussion of Haupt in the
text, “speech is often the only . . . evidence bearing on the question of intent.” Id. To say the least,
the same is not true with respect to the question whether the defendant committed the actus reus
of the crime charged. Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 935–36 (sharply distinguishing
between cases in which the statute establishes as an element a particular form of wrongful intent
and cases in which the prosecutor seeks only to prove a motive, which is not an element of the
crime charged, so as to support the inference that the defendant engaged in a particular action in
which the defendant denies having been involved).
315. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (suggesting greater likelihood of success
in asserting a First Amendment claim “if the employee’s speech more substantially involved
matters of public concern”).
316. See Dennis, supra note 4, at 33.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. Quint, supra note 2, at 1669; see also Dennis, supra note 4, at 25 (questioning the
recurring admission of rap-music evidence because rappers “are akin to fiction writers”).
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issues320—also should weigh in the decisional balance.321 The key point
is that courts must approach the balancing process with
thoughtfulness—thoughtfulness that should increase if, as suggested
earlier, they must craft case-specific justifications for their rulings only
after considering evidentiary objections in focused hearings conducted
outside the presence of the jury.
CONCLUSION
As noted by a leading authority on the subject, “Writers have
sometimes urged courts to use . . . the First Amendment to limit the
use of evidence. Judges do not seem enthusiastic about doing this.”322
This assertion is both true and troubling. In declining to scrutinize pastspeech evidence with care, lower courts have both overread key
Supreme Court precedents and undervalued the free-speech interests
these cases present. Of particular importance, those courts have paid
too little attention to modern developments in the First Amendment
field, particularly case law that aggressively protects speech on matters
of public concern and requires courts to evaluate thoughtfully asapplied challenges to speech-impairing generally applicable laws. This
Article points the way to an improved approach. The establishment of
meaningful, but nonburdensome, procedural requirements would
foster decision-making care as judges assess past-speech evidentiary
objections. And a vitalized substantive rule of exclusion—one that
reaches well beyond Rule 403 by taking meaningful account of all the
burdens imposed on free-speech values by the use of such evidence—
would help ensure that courts, in this set of cases, afford our most
fundamental liberties their fair due.

320. Dennis, supra note 4, at 33 (focusing on the close connectivity of prior-speech evidence
to, for example, a particular crime-connected modus operandi); Quint, supra note 2, at 1670–71
(distinguishing “general political views from views of greater specificity bearing on the alleged
offense[s]”); see also id. at 1671 n.169 (discussing, in this vein, specificity-laden past speech, such
as an address calling on listeners to block traffic on a bridge, offered to show the speaker’s
intentional engagement in that behavior); id. at 1674 (noting that inferring intent from
membership in a political group is a logically weak connection).
321. Quint, supra note 2, at 1676. Another relevant factor might be the extent to which the
defendant has “opened the door” to an investigation of such matters as his political beliefs
through the offering of his own evidence or arguments in the case.
322. 22A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5195 (4th ed. 2014) (citations omitted).

